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LIGHTS, LIGHTS, LIGHTS!
FINDING LIGHT IN THE DARKNESS OF THE
PUBLIC/PRIVATE PATENT DEBATE
Loletta Darden*
ABSTRACT
The current debate over whether patent rights are public or private leaves
both the patent and business communities stumbling in the dark, looking for
answers. More specifically, the current debate focuses on whether challenges
to patent validity fall within the public rights exception to Article III
adjudication.
When the Framers drafted Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 (the "IP Clause")
of the U.S. Constitution, they empowered Congress to create a Patent System
"securing for limited Times to ... Inventors the exclusive Right to their ...
Discoveries." Two key elements of this constitutional directive are:
"securing" and "exclusive right." The Framers, through the Constitution,
gave Congress the ability to create a contractual relationship between the
government and the most creative members of society - artists and inventors
- which led to the creation of private property rights. In exchange for
disclosing their creative endeavors, artists and inventors would be granted an
exclusive right to their creations for a limited time. The Framers intended this
contract to "secure" these rights privately in inventors in the way one holds
rights in other private property. For over a century, the Supreme Court has
declared patent rights to be private rights in property identical to those held
in real property. Now with the recent passage of the Leahy-Smith America
Invents Act, particularly inter partes review ("IPR"), Congress has given the
government the ability to strip inventors of their private property rights
without a trial before an Article III court.
This paper explores three points: (1) IPR, patent validity and the publicprivate patent rights debate that has allowed the PTO to break the
government-inventor contract; (2) the historical origins of U.S. patent rights
supporting private rights in patents, particularly patent validity, as private
rights; and (3) an alternative review process for addressing the patent quality
objectives of IPR that does not trample on constitutional rights.
*Loletta Darden is an Assistant Professor at Suffolk University Law School and Director of
the Intellectual Property and Entrepreneurship Clinic. I would like to thank Kevin Douglas,
Visiting Assistant Professor of Law at George Mason University's Scalia Law School, for
reading the initial drafts of this paper and providing thoughtful feedback.
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INTRODUCTION
In William Shakespeare's Hamlet,1 Claudius murdered Hamlet's father so
that he could assume the throne by marrying Hamlet's mother. Two months

after the King's murder, Claudius marries the Queen, his murdered brother's
wife. Suspecting Claudius's guilt in the murder, Prince Hamlet stages a play
that reenacts the murder. Hamlet's reenactment morally stirs King Claudius

to the point that he runs from the theater screaming, "Give me some light!"
followed by his trusted advisor, Polonius, also screaming, "Lights, lights,
lights !"12 The patent community now calls for lights to illuminate the darkness
created by recent Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("CAFC")

decisions declaring patent rights "to be primarily public rights" - the validity
of which the United States Patent Office ("PTO") can adjudicate under the
American Invents Act ("AIA").4
OVERVIEW OF THE AIA AND INTER PARTES REVIEW
The AIA represents the most significant patent reform since the 1952
Patent Act. In signing the AIA into law, President Obama maintained that the

AIA would "speed up the patent process so that innovators and entrepreneurs
can turn a new invention into a business as quickly as possible." Section 6 of
the AIA6 , permits the United States Patent and Trademark Office to adjudicate
patent validity through a process called inter partes review ("PR"), which

1 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, act 1, sc 1.
2 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, act 2, sc. 2.
' This paper does not distinguish between validity

decided in the process of determining
whether a patent meets the statutory requirements for patentability as established by the
PTO or in a court proceeding as part of an infringement action. Validity, whether
determined as part of PTO process or a court action, determines whether the patent owner is
entitled to a patent. Such validity determinations strip a patent owner of vested rights, and
are subject to constitutional protections, as I address in this paper. An issue for another day
is the standard by which both the PTO and courts determine validity.
4 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29,125 Stat. 284 (2011).

President Obama signed the bill into law on September 16, 2011. The Act has 60-day, 12month and 18-month effective dates, with September 16, 2012 and March 16, 2013, having
the most significant impact on patent application filing and prosecution. The AIA provides
for major patent reform, including amendments to the Patent Act outlined in Chapter 35 of
the U.S. Code Section 6 (effective date September 16, 2012) of the AIA, 35 U.S. Code
Section 311, is the subject of this paper.
5Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec' President Obama Signs
American Invents Act, Overhauling the Patent System to Stimulate Economic Growth, and
Announces New Steps to Help Entrepreneurs Create Jobs (Sept. 16, 2011).
6 See supra note 4, at 299-305.
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"allows patent' challenges to be resolved in-house [at the PTO] through
expedited post-grant processes"' before administrative law judges. Section 6,
according to Congressional records, was intended to facilitate the public's
ability to challenge improperly issued patents.9
The AIA also created the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (the "Board")
previously the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences - which hears all
IPR hearings. These hearings are trial-like proceedings between private
parties.o Under IPR procedures, anyone"1 other than the patent owner may
petition the Board to review the claims of an issued patent to assess whether
the invention described in the claims qualifies for patent protection. In other
words, the PTO takes a second look at the patent claims to determine whether
the claimed invention is indeed patentable, i.e., novel and nonobvious. 12 One
' This paper addresses utility patents, which apply to processes, machines, articles of
manufacture, compositions of matter, or any new and useful improvements thereof. Other
types of patent protection exist for designs (the look of a non-functional 2 or 3-dimensional
object) and asexually reproduced plants.
See supra note 5; see also 35 U.S.C. § 316(c) (2012). IPR is a patent post-grant review
that reexamines the claims of a patent for issues of patentability. Post-grant patent review is
not new. Congress passed the first post-grant review statute in 1981, permitting ex parte
reexamination of an issued patent when there is "a substantial new question of
patentability" based on issues of novelty and obviousness. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-517, § 1, 94 Stat. 3015, 3015 (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-307)... Ex parte
reexamination is a proceeding between a patent examiner and the patent applicant. In 1999,
Congress passed the second post-grant review statute, permitting inter partes reexamination.
Act of Nov. 29, 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 4604, 113 Stat. 1501, 570. The difference
between ex parte and inter partes reexamination is that third parties are allowed limited
participation in the proceeding. In 2011, the AIA IPR replaced inter partes reexaminations.
9 See H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, at 39 (2011) (noting "a growing sense that questionable patents
are too easily obtained and are too difficult to challenge");");")."); Id. at 48 (explaining that
the statute seeks to "improve patent quality and restore confidence in the presumption of
validity that comes with issued patents").
1o See 35 U.S.C. § 311(a), §316(c) (2012).
" Id. § 311(a). "Anyone" as expressed in the statute, truly means anyone, as there is no
standing requirement. And "according to some observers, experience 'from only the first
few years of IPR proceedings shows that they are frequently utilized by larger competitors
to weaken smaller, more innovative ones, as well as by vultures seeking to extract nuisance
settlements."' See Inter PartesReview of Patents: Innovation Issues (July 26, 2017),
https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R44905.html (citing and quoting Robert N.
Schmidt and J. Carl Cecere, MCM Portfolio, LLC v. Hewlett-PackardCo., Brief of Amici
Curiae Gary Lauder et al. in Support of Petitioner at 7, MCM Portfolio, LLC. v. HewlettPackard, Co. 137 S.Ct. 292 (mem.) (2016) (No. 15-1330), http://www.scotusblog.com/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/15-1330-Revised-Amici-Brief-G-Lauder-and-inventors-1.pdf; Id.
at 8 ("absence of a discrete set of potential petitioners" reportedly "makes it difficult for
inventors and potential investors to adjust their behavior to avoid a potential IPR, as they
might do to avoid litigation.").
12 35 U.S.C. § 311(b).
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must file a petition for IPR review "9 months (sic) after the grant of a patent
or issuance of a reissue patent" or if the PTO grants another type of post-grant
review, by the termination date of that other post-grant review." However,
where a patent owner has sued a party in federal court for patent infringement,
that party must file an IPR petition within one year of the service date of the
complaint. 14
A finding by the Board in favor of a Petitioner in an IPR results in the
cancellation of the challenged patent claims, which effectively revokes any
patent rights in those canceled claims and makes the patent invalid and
unenforceable as to those canceled claims. Since March 2016, the Board has
invalidated nearly 80 percent of the patent claims it has adjudicated through
1PR1 s compared with the federal court invalidation rate of only approximately
29 percent. The high invalidation rate in IPRs points to a need to improve the
quality of PTO patent application examination and allowance. The remedy
for improving quality is not to trample on patent owners' constitutional rights
by subjecting them to unconstitutional administrative adjudications where the
PTO sits as judge, jury, and executioner. Rather, Congress must implement
steps, as discussed in Part III, to improve the quality of allowed patent
applications by moving administrative challenges to validity (i.e.,
patentability) to a time before rights vest in the patent owner.
OVERVIEW OF THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE RIGHTS CONTROVERSY
The current public versus private patent rights debate centers on whether
patent rights are public rights, i.e. rights created by government decree, or
fundamental private property rights with their genesis in a constitutional
mandate. The current debate distinguishes two key patent rights: infringement
and validity. There is no question that a patent owner has a private right of
enforcement through an infringement action. The current debate focuses on,
instead, whether the patent owner has a private right to a patent's validity.
This paper first addresses where patent validity falls on the spectrum of
private versus public right in Part I.
Proponents of the public rights philosophy argue that rights in patent

validity (hereinafter "patent rights") are public rights because federal law
creates the right.1 6 That is, the right is "integrally related to a particular
federal government action" -- the passage and enforcement of the Patent

13
14

Id. § 311(c)(1) (2).
Id. § 315(b).

15

See Patent Trial and Appeal Board Statistics, USPTO (Mar. 31, 2016),

https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2016- 3-31%20PTAB.pdf.
16 Stem v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 490-91 (2011).
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Act. According to the brief filed on behalf of the federal respondent in Oil
States Energy Services v. Greene's Energy Group, LLC 8 before the CAFC:
Patents are quintessential public rights. Pursuant to its constitutional
authority to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts" by establishing
a patent system, U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, Cl. 8, Congress created the USPTO,
an agency with "special expertise in evaluating patent applications." Kappos
v. Hyatt, 566 U.S. 431, 445 (2012). Congress directed that agency to issue a
patent if "it appears that the applicant is entitled to a patent" under standards
set by federal law, 35 U.S.C. 131. Patents accordingly confer rights that "exist
only by virtue of statute." Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225,
229 n.5 (1964).19
By contrast, a private property right concerns "any matter which, from its
nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law or in equity." 20 For at least
a century, courts have adjudicated patents at common law as forms of
property. 21 Ever since 1856, the Supreme Court has confirmed the status of
patent rights as private rights stating that "by the laws of the United States,
the rights of a party under a patent are his private property [rights]."22 Twenty
years later the Supreme Court in Consolidated Fruit Jar Co. v. Wright
affirmed patent rights status, declaring "a patent for an invention is as much
property as a patent for land" because "[t]he right rests on the same foundation

Id. at 490.
1 Oil States Energy Serv. v. Greene's Energy Grp. 639 Fed. App'x. 639 (mem.) (Fed. Cir.
2016). The publishers accepted this paper for publication prior to the Supreme Court's
April 24, 2018, decision in Oil States Energy Services finding patent rights to be public
franchise rights. In a follow-up paper, I will address the practical ramifications of the
Court's decision, including the possible impact on the U.S. Patent system and start-up
company financing. In my view, the majority in Oil States missed the mark on several
points -- one of which I address here. While "the determination to grant a patent is a
'matte[r] involving public rights"' as the majority opined, once that patent issues, private
rights attach; See Evans v. Jordan, 8 F. Cas. 197, 199 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845). Once rights
attach, those rights have constitutional significance. For over a century, courts, including
the Supreme Court, have held "a patent for an invention [to be] as much property as a patent
for land" because "[t]he right rests on the same foundation and is surrounded and protected
by the same sanctions." ConsolidatedFruit Jarv. Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 96 (1876). While
patent rights are classified as "personal property" under the Patent Statute (35 U.S.C. §261),
not real property, the majority's decision allows the PTO to strip patentees of their private
personal property rights without a trial before an Article III court.
19 Brief for the Fed. Respondent in Opposition at 7, Oil States Energy Serv. v. Greene's
Energy Grp. No. 16-712 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
20 Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 284 (1855).
21 See Davoll v. Brown, 7 F. Cas. 197, 199 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845).
22 Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. 183, 197 (1856) (emphasis added).
17
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and is surrounded and protected by the same sanctions."23 Prior to both
ConsolidatedFruitJar and Brown, Chief Justice Marshall writing as a Circuit
Judge in Evans v. Jordan24 opined in 1815 that when taken together the patent
law and the "[C]onstitution . . give[s] to the inventor, from the moment of

invention, an inchoate property right," which is perfected upon the issuance
&

of the patent. 25 Another renowned jurist, Justice Joseph Story, also viewed
patent rights as private rights, stating in his opinion in Ex Parte Wood
Brundage26 that:
[t]he securing to inventors of an exclusive right to their inventions, was
deemed of so much importance, as a means of promoting the progress of
science and the useful arts, that the constitution has expressly delegated to
Congress the power to secure such rights to them for a limited period. The
inventor has, during this period, a property in his inventions; a property which
is often of very great value, and of which the law intended to give him the
absolute enjoyment and possession.27
U.S. legal and historical precedent has elevated the patent right to
common law status, despite the fact of its statutory origins. Thus, the patent
right is entitled to the same protections afforded real property. However, the
CAFC in a slew of recent decisionS 28 declared patent rights to be public rights
that the PTO may properly adjudicate instead of an Article III court.29
Although Supreme Court precedent on the issue of what constitutes a public
or private right generally is not at all clear,"o historical and legal precedent
lean in favor of categorizing patents as private property rights as demonstrated
in this paper.

Consolidated Fruit Jar v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 96 (1876); See supra note 21 (stating "we
protect intellectual property, the labors of the mind,... as much a man's own, and as much
the fruit of his honest industry, as the wheat he cultivates, or the flocks he rears").
24 See Evans v. Jordan, 8 F. Cas. 872, 873 (C.C.D. Va. 1813), affd, 13 U.S.
199, (1815).
23

Id.
Ex Parte Wood & Brundage, 22 U.S. 603 (1824).
27 Id. at 608 (emphasis added).
25

26

MCM Portfolio v. Hewlett-Packard, 812 F.3d 1284, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied,
137 S. Ct. 292 (2016); Cascades Projection v. Epson Am., 864 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2017);
Oil States Energy Serv. v. Greene's Energy Grp, 639 Fed. App'x. 639 (mem.) (Fed. Cir.
2016), cert granted, 137 S. Ct. 2239 (mem) (2017) (the Supreme Court heard arguments on
November 27, 2017. In addition to the cases above, this paper will provide an overview of
the precedential CAFC case addressing the public rights issue, which is Patlex. v.
Mosingoff, 758 F.2d 595, 604 (1985)).
28

29
30

Id.
See supra note 16 at 488.
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This paper explores the patent public versus private rights debate in three
parts: Part I explores recent CAFC cases finding patent rights to be public
rights; Part II explores the history of patent rights protection in the United
States beginning with its British antecedents and explores the Founding
Fathers' purpose for including the IP Clause in the Constitution; and Part III
explores alternatives for achieving the expressed quality review objectives of
the AIA without violating a patent owner's private rights. This paper does not
address the constitutionality of administrative law in allowing administrative
adjudications. *31

PART I - THE PRIVATE-PUBLIC PATENT RIGHTS DEBATE

A. From the PTO to the CAFC
1.

Background on the Patent Application Process

The process of obtaining a patent informs how a patent owner obtains
rights in enforcement and validity. To obtain patent protection in the United
States, one must submit an application to the PTO describing how to make
and use the invention as well as providing a set of claims that distinctly and
specifically describe the invention for which the applicant seeks protection.32
Once the inventor has filed the application, the inventor or his/her assignee
may label products and things that embody the invention claimed in the patent
application with the notation "patent pending." 33 The label places the public
on notice of the inventor/assignee's pending patent rights.3 4
To assess whether the claimed invention is entitled to patent protection,
the PTO assigns the application to an examiner who conducts a search of the
prior art.35 The examiner makes a careful assessment of the invention in view
See Mila Sohoni, Agency Adjudication and JudicialNondelegation: An Article III Canon,
107 Nw. U.L. Rev.4 1569, 1569 (2013) (discussing the judicial review of agency
adjudications regarding public and private rights).
32 See Patent Process Overview, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/patents-gettingstarted/patent-process-overview. See also 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, 111(a)112 (2012).
33 35 U.S.C. §§ 287, 292 (2012). §287 addresses the marking requirements for issued
patents and §292 covers the penalties for falsely marking an item "patent pending."
34 No rights vest in the inventor/patent applicant at this time. At this point, the label simply
places the public on notice of rights that may vest if the application matures into an issued
patent. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 287 and 292.
35 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (defining prior art as any document or activity that publicly
discloses the claimed invention before the effective filing date of the patent application
31
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of the prior art to determine if the claimed invention is indeed novel (new)
and not obvious (e.g., would not have been readily apparent to a skilled
inventor or designer in the field).3 6 If the application and claims meet the
statutory requirements for patentability, the PTO issues a Notice of
Allowance, which includes a request to pay the patent issue fee and any
publication fees before the PTO issues the patent."7 When the patent issues,
private rights vest in the patent owner.
Now the question is what rights vest in the patent owner as private rights:
both the right of enforcement and rights in validity? Clearly, the right of
enforcement vests - the right to exclude others from making, selling, using or
importing the patented invention - under both the common law and positive
law." The other key right, patent validity, also has positive law authorization

in the language of 35 U.S.C. §282, which declares that "[a] patent shall be
presumed valid." 39 However, the common law origins of this right are not so
apparent. Yet close examination of precedent, both legal and historical,
demonstrates that a patent owner has private property rights in patent validity
as well. The Supreme Court addressed this issue in McCormick, holding that
the PTO did not have the right to revoke a patent, e.g., cancel claims based on

invalidity.
Patent rights have two points of interest: (1) the public interest in validly
issued patents and (2) the private rights interest of the patent owner. Before
the vesting of rights, the patent owner has inchoate rights that mature into
"property" rights once the patent issues. This vesting of rights theory has been
the Supreme Court's position since as far back as 1898 when it expressly
articulated in McCormick that rights vest upon patent issuance. 4 0 Yet, recent
CAFC decisions contradict this view, specifically holding that patent rights
are primarily public rights the validity of which may be determined by an

claiming the invention. Exceptions to this definition of prior art are disclosures made 1year or less before the effective filing date of the claimed invention if (1) the inventor, a
joint inventor or another who obtained the subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly
from the inventor or a joint inventor made the disclosure, or (2) the inventor, joint inventor
or another who obtained the subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor
--had before the disclosure publicly disclosed the subject matter). See 102(b)(1)(A)-(B).
36 Id.; 35 U.S.C. § 103.
3 Patent Process Overview, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/patents -getting-started/patentprocess-overview#step7.
3 See 35 U.S.C. §271.
'9 See 35 U.S.C. §282.
40 See McCormick Harvesting Mach. v. Aultman, 169 U.S. 606 (1898); see also Evans v.
Jordan, 8 F. Cas. 197, 199 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845).
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administrative agency after rights have attached.41
How did the CAFC reach this conclusion given Supreme Court precedent
going as far back as 1856 holding patent rights to be private rights? 4 2 The next
section explores the CAFC's reasoning.
2.

CAFC PrecedentEstablishingPatentRights as Public Rights

The CAFC's decision in Patlex Corp. v. Mosingoff 43 sets the framework
for finding patent rights to be public rights. Patlex involved the retroactive
application of a patent reexamination statute and accompanying rules to a
patent application that issued before enactment of the statute. 44 Specifically,
Appellants argued that the application of the patent reexamination statute to
their prior issued patents deprived them of their rights under Article III. The
most relevant question raised in Patlex relating to the topic of this paper was

Did Gould have vested property or other interests which are protected by
the Fifth Amendment, the Seventh Amendment, or Article III, against the
retrospective effect of patent reexamination? 45
On appeal, the CAFC reasoned that "[t]he legislative history of the
reexamination statute makes clear that its purpose is to cure defects in
administrative agency action with regard to particular patents and to remedy
perceived shortcomings in the system by which patents are issued." 46 In other
words, the statute allows the PTO to reexamine issued patents that it has
reason to believe should have never issued. The CAFC further reasoned that
the overriding Congressional purpose in enacting the reexamination statute
was entitled to significant weight, and that "Congress did not act in an
arbitrary and irrational way to achieve its desired purposes." 47 The court, thus,
decided that application of the reexamination statute retroactively to the '845
patent did not deprive Gould of rights under the Seventh Amendment or
Article III of the U.S. Constitution.
Id.; Oil States Energy Servs. v. Greene's Energy Grp., 639 Fed. App'x. 639 (Fed. Cir.
2016); see also infra notes 60, 76 and accompanying text.
41

42

See supra note 40 (McCormick HarvestingMach.).

Patlex, Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 595 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, §1, 94 Stat. 3015 (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§
301-307 (1981).
45 See supra note 43 at 598.
46
Id. at 603.
43

44

47 Id.
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Gould argued that the right to jury trial in an Article III court to determine

the validity of his patent claims was "part of the bundle of property rights that
accompanied the grant of his patents, and thus that the retroactive scope of

reexamination worked a prohibited deprivation."48 Gould also argued that

-

under McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. v. Aultman, 9 he was entitled to
an Article III jury trial to assess the validity of his patent claims.
In McCormick, the Supreme Court held that only an Article III court had
the power to revoke, cancel, or annul a patent. McCormick involved an issue
of patent validity raised as part of a Reissue proceeding.so In deciding the
case, the Supreme Court found that the original patent claims were not invalid
because the reissue statute provided that the
surrender [of the original patent] shall take effect upon the issue of the
amended patent, 5s... [and that] until the amended patent shall have been
issued the original stand[s] precisely as if a reissue had never been applied for
... and must be returned to the owner upon demand.... If the patentee
abandoned his application for reissue, he is entitled to a return of his original
patent precisely as it stood when such application was made. 52
With regard to setting aside vested patent rights, the Supreme Court went
on to state, without limiting its reasoning to reissue cases, that -It has been settled by repeated decisions of this Court that when a patent
has received the signature of the Secretary of the Interior, countersigned by
the Commissioner of Patents, and has had affixed to it the seal of the Patent
Office, it has passed beyond the control and jurisdiction of that office, and is
not subject to be revoked or cancelled by the President or any other officer of
the government. [internalcitations omitted]. It has become the property of
the patentee, and as such is entitled to the same legal protection as other
property. 5
The only authority competent to set a patent aside, or to annul it, or to
correct it for any reason whatever, is vested in the courts of the United States,
and not in the department which issued the patent. 54 And in this respect a

48 Id.

McCormick Harvesting Mach. v. Aultman, 169 U.S. 606, 609 (1898).
A Reissue proceeding is one where the patent owner submits the original patent to the
PTO to correct errors that occurred during the prosecution.
49

5o

5
52

See supra note 49 at 611.

See supra note 49 at 610.

Id. at 608-09 (citing Seymour v. Osborne, 11 Wall. 516; Cammeyer v. Newton, 94 U. S.
225; United States v. Palmer, 128 U. S. 262, 271 (1888) (citing James v. Campbell, 104 U.
5

S. 356).
54 Id. at 609 (citing Moore v. Robbins, 96 U. S. 530); United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128
U. S. 315, 364 (1888); Mich. Land & Lumber Co. v. Rust, 168 U.S. 589, 593 (1897).
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patent for an invention stands in the same position and is subject to the same
limitations as a patent for a grant of lands. The power to issue either one of
these patents comes from Congress, and is vested in the same department.ss
In addition to McCormick, Gould argued that the Supreme Court's
decision in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,56
prohibited the assignment of issues traditionally adjudicated by Article III
courts to administrative tribunals.5 7 The CAFC reasoned, however, that the
rights at issue in Northern Pipeline were private rights, as opposed to the
public rights at issue in the instant case.5 The CFAC so reasoned even though
the application of the statue could result in the invalidity of the patent claims
- a result that would be inapposite to Supreme Court precedent in
McCormick.59 However, the CAFC went on to distinguish McCormick,
statingWe do not read McCormick Harvesting as forbidding Congress to
authorize reexamination to correct governmental mistakes, even against the
will of the patent owner. A defectively examined and therefore erroneously
granted patent must yield to the reasonable Congressional purpose of
facilitating the correction of governmental mistakes. This Congressional
purpose is presumptively correct, and we find that it carries no insult to the
Seventh Amendment and Article III.60
The CAFC's interpretation of McCormick in view of Northern Pipeline
forms the cornerstone of its argument that patent rights are public rights, the
adjudication of which Congress may shift to administrative courts.
3.

56

The CAFC Missed the Point in InterpretingMcCormick

McCormick Harvesting Machine, Co. v. Aultman, 169 U.S. 606, 609-10 (1898).
N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 51 (1982).

57 See Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 604 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (citing Northern

Pipeline stating that the Court "refused to uphold the legislative assignment to bankruptcy
courts of common law disputes historically adjudicated by Article III courts).
5 Id. at 604 (explaining that the CAFC reasoned that since the issue in Patlex involved a

right that could "only be conferred by the government," making it a public right, so no
constitutional violation resulted from the application of the reexamination statute to the
'845 patent).
59 See id.
60 Id. at 604 (Although the CAFC distinguished McCormick, it did acknowledge the right to
jury trial on validity as part of an infringement action.); Id. (A "right to a jury trial on issues
of patent validity that may arise in a suit for patent infringement is protected by the Seventh
Amendment." (quoting Swofford v. B & W, Inc., 336 F.2d 406, 409 (5th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 962 (1965)). Additionally, although the CAFC approved reexamination in
this instance, it is more likely than not that if AIA IPR violates the Constitution,
reexamination procedures should also be given a second look.
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In reaching the Patlex decision, the CAFC ignores the constitutional issue
at play in the case: private property rights. Private rights attached once the
patent "received the signature of the Secretary of the Interior, [was]

countersigned by the Commissioner of Patents," and had the seal of the Patent
Office affixed to it. What starts out a nascent right ripens into a full-fledged
property right upon issuance of the patent, 1 and jurisdiction over the patent's

validity passes "beyond the control and jurisdiction of [the PTO]," leaving the
PTO without the right to revoke or cancel it.6 2
Two important principles strip the PTO of jurisdiction once the patent
issues. First, Supreme Court precedent dictates that patent rights are
analogous to private property rights, deserving of all the protections afforded
rights in real property." Second, patent rights have common law antecedents,
which move them into the class of things constituting private rights.' Since
patent rights are subject to suit at common law,65 they must be treated like
other private property, making a determination of their validity subject to only
those courts empowered under Article III of the Constitution. 66 So in
McCormick, the Supreme Court correctly held that the PTO did not have the
power to invalidate a patent, and this would be true even if the PTO had
statutory authority to do so as the CAFC later argued in MCM Portfolio.67
B. Enter AIA Inter Partes Review

1.

MCM Portfolio LLC. v. Hewlett PackardCo.
a.

CAFC Analysis

In MCM Portfolio LLC. v. Hewlett PackardCo., 68 the CAFC continued
to distinguish McCormick and re-affirmed its Patlex decision. In MCM,

Appellant MCM owned U.S. Pat. No. 7,162,549 ("the '549 Patent). 69 The
PTAB found the claims of the '549 Patent invalid. On appeal, Appellant
MCM argued "that inter partes review is unconstitutional because any action
61
62
63
64

See Evans v. Jordan, 8 F. Cas. 872, 873 (C.C.D. Va. 1813), affd, 13 U.S. 199 (1815).
McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Aultman & Co., 169 U.S. 606, 608 (1898).
See Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183, 195 (1856).
John William Smith, A Compendium of Mercantile Law, 21 Jac. 1 c. 3 (George Morley

Dowdeswell 4th ed. 1623); see also infra note 133 and accompanying text.
65 See id.
66 Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.)
272, 283-84
(1856).
67 See supra note 62 at 609,
612.
68 See MCM Portfolio LLC. v. Hewlett Packard Co., 812 F.3d 1284, 1288-89
(Fed. Cir.
2015), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 292 (2016).
69 Id.

119

PUBLIC PRIVATE PATENT DEBATE

Vol. 9:2

revoking a patent must be tried in an Article III court with the protections of
the Seventh Amendment.""o Appellant MCM asserted that the "Supreme
Court's decision in McCormick," [citation omitted], bars the PTO from
invalidating patents in inter partes review proceedings and that only an Article
III court can exercise that authority." 7 2 In response, the CAFC reasoned that
McCormick involved a case in which the PTO lacked Congressional authority
to institute the reissue proceeding, whereas, in Patlex and the instant case
(MCM), statutory authority existed for both reexamination and IPR."
Specifically, the CAFC stated that -McCormick did not address Article III and certainly did not forbid
Congress from granting the PTO the authority to correct or cancel an issued
patent. Congress has since done so by creating the ex parte reexamination
proceeding in 1980; the inter partes reexamination procedure in 1999; and
inter partes review, post-grant review, and Covered Business Method patent
review in 2011. See Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980)
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 302-07); Intellectual Property and
Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113
Stat. 1501 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 311 et seq. (1999)); LeahySmith America Invents Act ("AIA"), Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 6(a), 125 Stat.
284, 299-304 (2011) (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 311 et seq. (2013)). Supreme
Court precedent demonstrates that these statutes, and particularly the inter
partes review provisions, do not violate Article III.74
The CAFC went on to state that75 _

[t]he patent right "derives from an extensive federal regulatory
scheme," Stern, 131 S.Ct. at 2613, and is created by federal law. Congress
created the PTO, "an executive agency with specific authority and expertise"
in the patent law, Kappos v. Hyatt, * 132 S.Ct. 1690, 1696, 182 L.Ed.2d 704
(2012), and saw powerful reasons to utilize the expertise of the PTO for an
important public purpose - to correct the agency's own errors in issuing
patents in the first place. Reacting to "a growing sense that questionable
patents are too easily obtained and are too difficult to challenge," Congress
sought to "provid[e] a more efficient system for challenging patents that
should not have issued" and to "establish a more efficient and streamlined
Id. at 1288. (MCM raised virtually the same question that the Supreme Court recently
granted cert to hear in Oil States Energy Services. Thus, the reasoning applied here to MCM
should also be applied in deciding the question in Oil States Energy Services).
71 See id.
72 Id. at 1288.
73 See id. at 1285, 1289, 1291.
74 Id. at 1289.
75 See id. at 1290-91.
70

2018

AM. U. INTELL. PROP. BRIEF

120

patent system that will improve patent quality and limit unnecessary and

counterproductive litigation costs." H.R.Rep. No. 112-98, 2011 U.S.C.C.A.N.
67, 69, at 39-40. There is notably no suggestion that Congress lacked
authority to delegate to the PTO the power to issue patents in the first instance.
It would be odd indeed if Congress could not authorize the PTO to reconsider
its own decisions.
The CAFC went on to hold, based on the preceding reasoning and other
reasoning stated in the opinion, that "the inter partes review provisions do not
violate Article III."76
b.

Comment on CAFC Reasoning in MCM

The CAFC completely ignored the constitutional issue raised in MCM.
The court chose to focus instead on the existence of statutory authorization
allowing the PTO to conduct IRP adjudications. This, in my view, was
erroneous. By focusing on statutory authorization, the CAFC could easily
dismiss the constitutional question as a non-issue, which it did. The CAFC's
choice to ignore the constitutional question is a curious one since in Patlex,
the court acknowledged the constitutional issue.
2.

CascadesProjection LLC v. Epson

The next case to significantly address the public/private debate was
CascadesProjectionLLC v. Epson.7 7 Cascades Projection owns U.S. Pat. No.

7,688,347 ("the '347 Patent"). In 2015, Epson America, Inc. ("Epson") and
Sony Corp. ("Sony") each separately petitioned the PTO requesting institution

of an IPR of the "347 Patent. The Board subsequently instituted both
proceedings.
In the Sony proceeding, Cascades Projection argued that Article III
prohibited the Board from canceling patents. The Board, in a final written
decision in both cases, found certain claims of the '347 Patent to be invalid,
and acknowledged that it lacked the authority to rule on constitutional
issues.7 1 Cascades Projection appealed the constitutional question to the
CAFC, requesting an initial en banc hearing. 79 The court referred the question
to the active judges of the CAFC; a plurality of which voted to deny the en
banc hearing. Cascades sought a grant of certiorari to the Supreme Court,

76

Id. at 1291.
See generally Cascades Projection LLC v. Epson America, Inc., 864 F.3d 1309, 13101311 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (en banc), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 292 (2016).
78 See Sony Corp. v. Cascades Projection LLC, No. IPR2015-01846, Dkt. No. 32, at 34-35
77

(P.T.A.B. Jan. 11, 2017).
79 See supra note 77.
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which the Court denied. So I will focus on the CAFC denial of the en banc
hearing.
In her concurrence in the denial of the en banc hearing before the CAFC,
Judge Newman said,
There is, of course, a public interest in the innovation incentive of the
patent law, see, e.g., Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff 758 F.2d 594, 604 (Fed.
Cir. 1985), but that does not convert a private right into a public right. That is
not the question presented by the current debate concerning the America
Invents Act. 80
Judge Newman's statement raises two noteworthy points:
(1) She acknowledged that there is a "public interest" in the innovation
incentive of the patent law." And, in her own words confirmed, that the mere
presence of a public interest "does not convert a private right into a public
right." 8 2 I agree 100%. But this conversion of private rights into public rights
seems to be the position taken by the CAFC decisions in both Patlex and
MCM. Based on previous CAFC decisions, one can only reasonably conclude
that the decisions stand for the proposition that patent rights are public rights,
at least with respect to the issuance of patents, which means it is perfectly
appropriate to have the PTO adjudicate and potentially cancel, revoke or
annul vested private property rights in patents.
(2) Judge Newman refers to the issue in CascadesProjectionas an Article
III issue, not a private/public issue as addressed in Patlex and MCM Portfolio.
With all due respect to Judge Newman, although Cascades' appeal requested
review of the PTO's authority to cancel or annul patents under Article III,
implicit in the question raised by Cascades Projectionis whether patent rights
are private or public. If patents are indeed private rights, the PTO is not
qualified under the Constitution to adjudicate IPRs in their present form, and
in the words of Circuit Judge Reyna, "the [PTO's] cancellation of original
patent claims must cease."" In his concurrence, Judge Dyk recognized the
importance of the private right-public right debate:
contrary to the dissents, there is no inconsistency in concluding that patent
rights constitute property and that the source of that property right is a public
right conferred by federal statute. 84
so See supra note 77 at 1310.
s Id.
82 Id. (emphasis added).
See Cascades Projection LLC v. Epson America, Inc., 864 F.3d 1309, 1326 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (Reyna, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1312 (O'Malley, J., dissenting) ("The Supreme
Court has explained that "public rights" may be assigned to a non-Article III forum for
resolution without violating the Constitution, but that core private rights are only subject to
adjudication in Article III courts. Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 484-86 (2011).")
84 See id.at 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (Dyk, J., concurring) (first citing O'Malley, J., dissenting
8
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Judge O'Malley, likewise, found that the current debate focuses whether
patent rights are private or public rights:

In MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-PackardCo., 812 F.3d 1284 (Fed. Cir.
2015), a panel of this court stated that "patent rights are public rights." Id. at
1293. We did so in the context of rejecting a constitutional challenge to inter
partes review ("IPR") . . ss

By characterizing a patent as a public right, therefore, the panel in MCM
was able to conclude that patent validity is 'susceptible to review by an
administrative agency'-in other words, that IPR proceedings do not violate
the Constitution. 86
In denying the en banc hearing, Judge Dyk wrote on behalf of the

plurality:
The petition raises the same constitutional challenge to the inter partes
review provisions of the America Invents Act that the court rejected in MCM

Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-PackardCo., 812 F.3d 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert.
denied 137 S. Ct. 292 (2016). MCM was correctly decided, and there is no
need to restate MCM's reasoning here. 87
The CAFC missed a great opportunity to clear up its inconsistent
treatment of McCormick and to "give us light" on the public/private issue.
a.

Comment on CAFC Reasoning in both MCM and Cascades

The CAFC's conclusion that patent rights are public rights ignores the
hybrid nature of patent rights. As already discussed, patent rights consist of
both public and private interests." The public interest is in the issuance of
valid patents and the disclosure of information that promotes the useful arts
and sciences. The private interest is in the thing - the rights - offered and
granted in exchange for the disclosure.8 9 To "induce" the inventor to make

public his invention, "[C]ongress, by its legislation made in pursuance of the
constitution, has guarantied (sic) to him an exclusive right to it for a limited

then citing Reyna, J. dissenting).
5 id.

See id. at 1312 (citing MCM Portfolio, 812 F.3d at 1293).
87 Cascades Projection LLC v. Epson America, Inc., 864 F.3d 1309, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(Dyk, J., concurring) (plurality opinion).
8 See B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1316-17 (2015)
(Thomas, & Scalia, JJ., dissenting).
89 See United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224, 239 (1888).
86
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time; and the purpose of the patent is to protect him in this monopoly." 90 The
CAFC in deciding Cascades Projection focused only on the public rights
component.
When dealing with hybrid rights, both interests must be considered.
Justice Thomas in his dissent in B&B Hardwarerecognized the hybrid nature
of trademark rights, and the dual interests in patent rights should be similarly
recognized. 91 Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, opined that:
[t]rademark registration under the Lanham Act has the characteristics of
a quasi-private right and that, because registration is a statutory government
entitlement, no one disputes that the [Trademark Trial and Appeal Board] may
constitutionally adjudicate a registration claim. But the right to adopt and
exclusively use a trademark appears to be a private property right that 'has
been long recognized by the common law and the chancery courts of England
and of this country. 92
Given this historical framework, Justice Thomas stated that "it appears
that the trademark infringement suit at issue in this case might be of a type
that must be decided by 'Article III judges in Article III courts."' 93
The rights at issue in CascadesProjection (as well as those in Patlex and
MCM Portfolio) are also inherently hybrid. As Judge Newman asserted, there
is a public interest in the "innovation incentive ... but that does not convert a
private right into a public right." 94 Once rights are vested, private rights

attach, and divestment of those rights through less than an Article III Court is
impermissible. As Judge Reyna stated in his dissent, "The Board's
cancellation of patents through inter partes review may be the type of agency
activity that 'sap[s] the judicial power as it exists under the federal
Constitution" and "establish[es] a government of a bureaucratic character
alien to our system."' 95
Implicit in the CAFC's reasoning is the concept that patent rights must
yield to the public interest in validly issued patents. This idea is diametrically
opposite the Supreme Court's reasoning, which finds patent rights to be
private rights. 96 A patent holder's rights only yield to the public interest
Id. (emphasis added); see also United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178,
186 (1933).
91 See B&B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1316-17.
90

92

See id. at 1317 (quoting United States v Steffens; United States v. Wittenmann; United

States v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879) [hereinafter Trademark Cases]).
93 Id. (quoting Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2616 (2011)).
94 Cascades Projection LLC v. Epson Am., Inc., 864 F.3d 1309, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(Newman, J., concurring).
95 Id. at 1326 (Reyna, J., dissenting) (quoting Crowell v. Crowell, 285 U.S. 22, 57 (1932)).
96 Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 604 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("A defectively
examined and therefore erroneously granted patent must yield to the reasonable
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because the CAFC has ignored precedent and found patent rights to be public

-

rights. 97 Specifically, in MCM Portfolio, the CAFC held that

[t]he patent right 'derives from an extensive federal regulatory scheme'
[citation omitted] and is created by federal law. Congress created the PTO,

'an executive agency with specific authority and expertise' in the patent law,
[citation omitted] and saw powerful reasons to utilize the expertise of the PTO
for an important public purpose - to correct the agency's own errors in
issuing patents in the first place. 98

Yet, the PTO's high invalidation rate under IPR suggests that PTO
expertise is not enough. 99 Congress must do something to assist the PTO in
getting the decision to issue a patent right more often than not during the
examination phase.100 Getting the decision to issue a patent wrong in five out
of eight patents challenged in IPR should be unacceptable to both the PTO
and Congress. 10 1 Part III discusses a process for improving patent quality by
moving third-party challenges to validity (i.e., patentability) to the
examination phase of the patenting process.

The CAFC acknowledged Congress' attempt to manage patent quality
-

through IPR and other post-grant proceedings, stating

Congress sought to 'provid[e] a more efficient system for challenging
patents that should not have issued' and to 'establish a more efficient and
streamlined patent system that will improve patent quality and limit

unnecessary and counterproductive litigation costs.'

102

The CAFC also found that Congressional assignment to the PTO the
power to resolve patent validity contravenes neither Article III nor the
Seventh Amendment.10 The CAFC's conclusion is true only if the patent
Congressional purpose of facilitating the correction of governmental mistakes. This
Congressional purpose is presumptively correct, and we find that it carries no insult to the
Seventh Amendment and Article III.").
9 See id.; MCM Portfolio LLC. v. Hewlett Packard Co., 812 F.3d 1284, 1293 (Fed. Cir.
2015).
98 MCM Portfolio, 812 F.3d at 1290 (" [W]hat makes a right 'public' rather than private is
that the right is integrally related to particular federal government action."(quoting Stern v.
Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2613 (2011)).
99 See 35 U.S.C. § 311(c)(1); see also Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does
the U.S. Patentand Trademark Office Grant too Many Bad Patents?:Evidence from a

Quasi-experiment, 67 STAN. L. REV. 613, 618-19 (2015).
100 See Part III (B).
101 See supra note 99.

MCM Portfolio LLC. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 812 F.3d 1284, 1290-91 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
103 See id. at 1291 ("The teachings of the Supreme Court in Thomas, Schor,
and Stern compel the conclusion that assigning review of patent validity to the PTO is
102
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rights at issue in the public-private rights cases are indeed public rights. If so,
an administrative agency may adjudicate these rights in the first instance. 104
Taking a closer look at the public rights interest-- the public interest stems
from the United States Constitution, which identifies inventions and
discoveries as a way of artistically and intellectually advancing societal
10 Advancing the intellectual and artistic growth of the new country
growth.o
was an interest of particular concern to the Founding Fathers. 106 However, in
addition to the public interest, the Constitution also provided for the vesting
of private rights in inventors by incentivizing authors and inventors to share
their discoveries with the public by "securing" to them rights in their work for
a limited amount of time. 107
Although the genesis of patent rights is the Constitution, it is also beyond
dispute that patent rights derive from a statutory scheme designed to
implement the mandates of the IP Clause. And while it is true that no rights
can be acquired in a patent unless "authorized by statue, and in the manner
10 the operative phrase here is that "no
the statute prescribes,"o
rights can be
acquired" in a patent unless the prescribed statutory requirements are met.
What the CAFC fails to address is that once patent rights vest, what was once
a public right takes on the characteristics of private rights.
While rights in patents exist because of a statutory construction designed
to promote societal advancement, the owner receives the equivalent of a
private property right in the claimed invention once the patent issues. 109 Yes,
the determination of whether the invention meets the qualifications for patent
issuance is a statutory construction; but once an application meets those
qualifications the patent issues, and the rights conferred are akin to rights in
real property, which are common law rights. 110 And the Supreme Court has
consistent with Article III.").
See MCM Portfolio LLC., 812 F.3d at 1293.
U.S. CONsT.Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
106 Id.; see infra notes 180, 181, 182 and accompanying text.
107 See Oil States Energy Services v. Greene's Energy Group, LLC, 639 Fed. App'x.
639
(mem.) (Fed. Cir. 2016).
10s See Cascades Projection LLC v. Epson America, Inc., 864 F.3d 1309, 1310-1311 (Fed.
Cir. 2017) (en banc).
109 Consolidated Fruit Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 96 (1876) (A patent for an invention is
as much property as a patent for land. The right rests on the same foundation and is
surrounded and protected by the same sanctions).
110 Id.; see also McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. v. Aultman, 169 U.S. 606, 609-10
(1898) (While a patent for a grant of lands is absolutely free from the future control of the
officers of the Land Department after it has once issued, and jurisdiction over the matter
cannot again be obtained, this is subject to a single qualification in the case of a patent for
an invention where the patentee, his legal representatives or assigns, find the original patent
inoperative or invalid by reason of a defective or insufficient specification, or by reason of
1

105
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long held that "Congress may not 'withdraw from judicial cognizance any
matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in

"

equity, or admiralty."'

Although Supreme Court precedent is far from clear on this issue of
private versus public rights, there is Supreme Court and historical precedent
holding patent rights to be private rights that enjoy the same privileges, rights
and benefits afforded real property. 1 12 Yet, the CAFC's recent decisions
declaring patent rights to be public rights subject to agency adjudication strips
patent owners of the rights to protection of property in the manner intended
by the Constitution. 113

Given the CAFC's decision on this issue, we, the patent community, call
for light in the way Claudius needed lights to illuminate his path.114 Perhaps,
the Supreme Court will give us that light in Oil States Energy Services v.
Greene'sEnergy Group.
3.
a.

Oil States Energy Services v. Greene'sEnergy Group
Overview of Oil States Energy Services v. Greene's Energy
Group

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Oil States Energy Services LLC
15
v. Greene 's Energy Group, LLCs
on the issue of whether patent rights
constitute public or private rights. The Petitioner, Oil States Energy Services

("Oil States"), owns U.S. Pat. No. US Patent No. 6,179,053 (the "'053
Patent"). The PTAB found that the '053 patent was anticipated by Oil States'
earlier filed patent application. In reaching its decision on the validity of the

claims, the Board applied the "broadest reasonable interpretation" test set out
in Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee 116 and found the claims invalid. Oil States
then petitioned for review by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court certified
the following question for review:

the patentee claiming as his invention or discovery more than he had a right to claim as new
(provided the error has arisen through inadvertence, accident, or mistake, and without
fraudulent or deceptive intention); see generally Part II, infra, for a discussion of the
common law nature of patents.
111 Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, (1856); see also
Part II, infra (discussing the common law nature of patent rights).
112 See Consolidated Fruit Jar Co, 94 U.S. at 96.
113 See McCormick Harvesting Machine, Co. v. Aultman, 169 U.S. 606 (1898); see also
U.S. CONsT. art. III.
114 See William Shakespeare, HAMLET, Act 2, Sc. 2.
115 Oil States Energy Serys., LLC, v. Greene's Energy Grp., LLC, 639 Fed. App'x
639 (Fed.
Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2239 (mem) (2017).
116 Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 890
(2016).
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Whether inter partes review, an adversarial process used by the Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) to analyze the validity of existing patents, violates
the Constitution by extinguishing private property rights through a nonArticle III forum without a jury.
In its brief, Oil States argues:
This Court has always regarded patents as property rights that may only
be adjudicated as private rights-i.e., by Article III courts. Patents and the
rights they confer have been referred to as "property" as early as the 1793
Patent Act. 1 Stat. 318, 320 (1793) (entitling inventors to "present a petition
to the Secretary of State, signifying a desire of obtaining an exclusive
property" in that invention); see also 35 U.S.C. § 261. Hence this Court's
observation over a century ago that a patent takes its subject "from the
people, from the public, and ma[kes it] the private property of the patentee."
Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. at 370. The resulting patent rights are
unquestionably the patent owner's "private property." Brown v. Duchesne,
60 U.S. 183, 197 (1856). Only one "authority [is] competent to set" a private
property right such as "a patent aside, or to annul it, or to correct it for any
reason whatever." McCormick HarvestingMach. Co. v. C. Aultman & Co.,
169 U.S. 606, 609 (1898). It is the same authority that can do so for all
private rights: "the courts of the United States." ibid. 117
Greene's Energy, in response, argues that patent rights are "public
[rights], granted to promote the paramount public purpose of the progress of
science and useful arts.""' Greene's Energy further argues that -Congress created IPR to advance this paramount public purpose [promote
the progress of science and useful arts] by reducing the prevalence of invalid
monopolies. Thus the nature of the patent right, which Petitioner ignores out
of necessity, authorizes Congress to provide for limited post-issuance
patentability determinations by the PTO. 119
Greene's Energy also makes an interesting alternative argument drawing
on Justice Thomas' dissent in B&B Hardware v. Hargisl20, asserting that:

Brief for Petitioner at 28-29, Oil States Energy Servs. LLC v. Greene's Energy Grp.
LLC, 137 S. Ct. 2239 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
1" Brief for Respondent at 16, Oil State Energy Servs. LLC v. Greene's Energy Grp. LLC,
137 S. Ct. 2239 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
117

119 Id.
120

B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1316 (2015) (Thomas,
J.,

dissenting).
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At the very least, patents are quasi-private rights, that is, "statutory

entitlements bestowed by the government on individuals." B & B Hardware
v. Hargis Indus., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1316 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted). Either way, the rights granted remain subject to the power
of Congress and subservient to the paramount public purpose. 121
In support of its position, Greene's Energy argues that:
The Constitution delegates to Congress the sole, discretionary, and
permissive power to secure exclusive rights to inventors. U.S. Const. Art. I, §
8, cl. 8. Congress decides the nature and scope of any such exclusive rights
for limited times, whether through patents or otherwise. See Motion Picture

Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 510-11, 517 (1917)
(Congress is "the source of all rights under patents"). The Article I grant is
"permissive," meaning that nothing in the Constitution requires giving
exclusive rights to inventors for their discoveries. Deepsouth Packing Co.,

Inc. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 530 (1972). Thus, Congress has broad
authority to create the patent right, to define the contours of that right, and to

establish the conditions attached to the grant of that right. Id. ("[T]he sign of
how far Congress has chosen to go can come only from Congress.").

But U.S. patents derive entirely from federal statute: The [patent]
monopoly did not exist at common law, and the rights, therefore, which may
be exercised under it cannot be regulated by the rules of the common law. It
is created by the act of Congress; and no rights can be acquired in it unless
authorized by statute, and in the manner the statute prescribes. Gayler v.

Wilder, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 477, 494 (1850); see also Crown Die & Tool Co.
v. Nye Tool & Mach. Works, 261 U.S. 24, 40 (1923) ("Patent property is the
creature of statute law and its incidents are equally so and depend upon the
construction to be given to the statutes creating it and them, in view of the

policy of Congress in their enactment."). The patent right is created
exclusively through the statutory monopoly and has no separate existence.

See Gayler, 51 U.S. at 493-94. P. 12-13.122
Greene's Energy's argument turns on the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Stern v. Marshall'2 3 that public rights derive from a federal regulatory
scheme. 124 The CAFC also adopted that view in MCM, opining that "the

patent right 'derives from an extensive federal regulatory scheme [citation
121
122

123
12

4

See supra note 118 at 16-17, note 4.
Id. at 12-13.

Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011).
Id. at 490-91.
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omitted] and is created by federal law,"' 125 thus, concluding that patent rights
are public rights that the PTO may properly adjudicate.
b.

Thoughts on Oil States Energy Services

The Supreme Court should find patent rights to be private property rights.
As will be discussed in Part II, the Founding Fathers' intent was to create a
patent protection system in the United States that was more protective of
inventor's rights than that of England. Madison argued vehemently for
protection of these rights as property rights. The Supreme Court from the very
early patent cases treated patent rights as property rights deserving of
protection akin to that afforded property rights in land.
Over the years, patent rights have become critical assets for business
growth and sustainability. 126 The importance of patent rights is not new, as
business people have relied on patent rights since the inception of U.S. Patent
law as major assets in starting and growing businesses. Reducing patent rights
status from private rights, as historically viewed, to public rights status under
recent determinations, works a detriment to patent owners in the loss of
private property assets that patent owners can rely on to grow and sustain a
business.
C. Conclusion to Part I
The support for patent rights being public rights centers on the fact that
patent rights stem from a statute. Congress, however, enacted the patent
statutes to implement the directives of the IP Clause. The Supreme Court in
Graham v. John Deere said the IP Clause sets forth a "standard" that "cannot
be ignored," not a set of permissions that may be acted on at Congress'
discretion. 127 If Congress chooses to enact patent laws, and it has so chosen
to enact such laws, it must adhere to the mandates of the IP Clause, which
require rights to be "secured" to inventors in exchange for disclosing
inventions that promote societal advancement. 128

See MCM Portfolio LLC. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 812 F.3d 1284, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(citing Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 at 490).
126 The Department of Commerce, IntellectualProperty and the U.S. Economy:
2016
Update, (2016) (recognizing the value of intellectual property as a business asset: "As the
world leader in innovation, U.S. companies have relied on intellectual property (IP) as one
of the leading tools with which such advances were promoted and realized. Patents,
trademarks, and copyrights are the principal means for establishing ownership rights to the
creations, inventions, and brands that can be used to generate tangible economic benefits to
their owner.").
127 See Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 5
(1966).
128 See id. at 5-6.
125
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PART II - PROPERTY RIGHTS: A KEYSTONE RIGHT
"[A]s a man is saidto have a right to his property, he may be equally said
to have a property in his rights. " ~James Madison
A. The Birth of the IP Clause of the United States Constitution
1.

The Origin of the United States PatentRights
a.

Overview of British PatentLaw

As the Founding Fathers sought to protect patent rights in the new land,
they would have been aware of British Law -- the Statute of Monopolies --

enacted in 1623, which addressed patent rights. 129 The Statute of Monopolies
was the only statutory basis and legal foundation for patent protection in
England."'o Sections 2 and 6 of the Statute of Monopolies are of particular
import:
2. And all monopolies, and all such commissions, grants, licenses,
charters, letters patents, proclamations, inhibitions, restraints, warrants of
assistance, and all other matters and things tending as aforesaid, and the force
and validity of them, and every of them, ought to be, and shall be forever
hereafter examined, heard, tried, and determined, by and according! to
the common laws of this realm, and not otherwise.
6(a). Provided also, that any declaration before mentioned shall not extend
to any letters patents (b) and grants of privilege for the term of fourteen years
or under, hereafter to be made, of the sole working or making of any manner
of new manufactures within this realm (c) to the true and first inventor (d) and
inventors of such manufactures, which others at the time of making such
letters patents and grants shall not use (e), so as also they be not contrary to
the law nor mischievous to the state by raising prices of commodities at home,
English Statute of Monopolies 1623, 21 Jac 1, c 3,
http://www.peoplesmandate.iinet.net.au/EnglishStatute-ofMonopolies 623.pdf
(providing that "[t] he patent law in England began to shift toward a more Lockean
perspective when common law courts assumed jurisdiction over patent disputes). It must be
noted that although Parliament enacted the Statue of Monopolies in 1623," it took a
century-long process for both the statute and the common law to prevail and to consistently
subject the royal prerogative to the limitations envisioned in them." Oren Bracha, Owning
Ideas: A History ofAnglo-American Intellectual Property, Chapter 1, p. 23 (unpublished
S.J.D. thesis, Harvard Law School 2005), available at,
https://law.utexas.edu/faculty/obracha/dissertation/pdf/chapterl.pdf.
130 See supra note 129.
129
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"

or hurt of trade, or generally inconvenient (f): the same fourteen years to be
accounted from the date of the first letters patents or grant of such privilege
hereafter to be made, but that the same shall be of such force as they should
be if this act had never been made, and of none other (g). 1
Section 2 of the Statute shifted the adjudication of patent rights from the
King's (or Queen's) Privy Council, to the common law courts. 13 2 Section 2
expressly provides that the "validity of letters patent shall be 'determined, by
and according to the common law' of the realm, England.""' So for
proponents of the public rights view to say that patent rights, particularly
validity, were not decided as a matter of the common law in England is
contrary to the mandate of the original Statue of Monopolies.
The Statute of Monopolies permitted a party to challenge the validity of a
patent or assert invalidity as a defense in response to an infringement
action.134 To fully understand the impact of the Statute of Monopolies on the
evolution of patent laws and rights in England, let us briefly review the law
in England before passage of the Statute.
i. PatentGrants and the Crown
Before the passage of the Statute of Monopolies in England, the crown
had control over how and to whom it would award patents in inventions or
trade.13 5 As Professor Lemley stated in his article, Why do Juries Decide if
Patentsare Valid?, "Royal favor rather than inventive acumen drove the grant
of patents during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century" in
England.13 6 Lemley goes on to point out that "[c]onsistent with the idea that
patents were royal grants of privilege only the King had the power to revoke
[a] patent.""
131 See Id.
132 See id. Although

it was more than 130 years before the Privy Council actually
relinquished jurisdiction over patent validity to the common law courts. See infra note 134
and accompanying text.
133 Id. at §2 (emphasis added).
134

Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents:An Intellectual History, 1550-

1800, 52 Hastings L.J. 1255, 1272 (2001).
135

See Mark Lemley, Why do Juries Decide If Patents are Valid?, 99 Va. L. Rev.
1673,

1680 (2013) (stating "Particularly during the reign of James I, exclusive patent rights were
granted to favored merchants for a wide variety of common arts, including the making of

playing cards and the running of taverns.") (footnotes omitted).
136 id.
137

Id. at 1681 (emphasis added) (citing W.M. Hindmarch, A Treatise on the Law Relative to

PatentPrivilegesfor the Sole Use of Inventions: And the Practice of ObtainingLetters

Patentfor Inventions 3 (Harrisburg, Pa., 1.G. M'Kinley & J.M.G. Lescure 1847; stating
"inventors are never entitled as of right to letters patent . . but they must obtain them from
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Despite the passage of the Statue of Monopolies, the Privy Council
continued to assume jurisdiction over patent disputes for the next 130 years. 13 8

Adam Mossoff writes, "[i]n 1753, the Privy Council relinquished to the law
courts jurisdiction over determining the validity of patents for inventions; thus
putting into effect, albeit 130 years late, section 2 of the Statute of
Monopolies." 139 At this point, the doctrine of patent law in England began to
evolve into its modern-day version. I submit that it was the Founding Fathers
intention to establish jurisdiction over patent matters in the courts, not some
Privy Council equivalent that might act at the whim of the ruling party and
not the law (see note 140, 144 and accompanying text).
ii.

Patent Rights and the English Common Law

Once patent rights adjudication shifted to the English law courts, there
was also a shift in focus from the benefit to the Crown to the benefit to society
in awarding and enforcing patent rights, including patent validity. 140
Illustrating this point, Mossoff writes that Lord Mansfield instructed a jury in
a patent infringement case that the plaintiff-patentee had to prove three
elements to prevail:
1. whether 'the defendant did use that which the plaintiff claims to be his
invention';

2. 'whether the invention was new or old'; and
3. 'whether the specification is such as instructs others to make it,'

141

with elements two and three pointing to the benefit to society. In a later

case before Justice Buller, Mossoff writes, "Justice Buller, argued that '[t]he
consideration which the patentee gives for his monopoly is, the benefit which
the public are to derive from his invention, after his patent is expired; and that

benefit is secured to them by means of a specification of the invention."'

14 2

the Crown by petition, and as a matter of grace and favour. . .") (emphasis in original)
138 See supra note 134 at 1285. The majority in Oil States takes the Privy Council's
continued jurisdiction over patent validity cases after passage of the Statute of Monopolies
as an indication that Privy Council proceedings were an alternative to court proceedings.
However, the Statute of Monopolies shifted jurisdiction over patent matters to the common
law court; yet the Privy Council continued to decide patent matters. Simply because an
entity acts in defiance of the law does not make that entity's action legal or lawful. I will
further expound on this position in my follow-up paper addressing the majority's reasoning
in Oil States.
139 Id. at 1286.
140 See generally Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents:An
Intellectual

History, 1550-1800, 52 Hastings L.J. 1255, 1292-1297 (2001).
141

Id. at 1292.

142

Id. at 1293-94 (citation omitted).
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According to Mossoff, Justice Buller goes on to instruct the jury as follows:
" [w]henever it appears that the patentee has made a fair disclosure, I have
always had a strong bias in his favour; because in that case he is entitled to
the protection which the law gives him."'143
This shift from the Privy Council to the common law courts allowed the
English patent law to evolve to the point where inventor's rights were seen as
just as important, if not more so, as the public interest. " In my view, Madison
sought to re-create this new inventor's rights focus in the new country. 145
b.

The United States Constitution'sIP Clause - Impetus and
Motivation

No one states the importance of patent rights better than Justice Story:
No class of men are more meritorious, or are better entitled to public
patronage, than authors and inventors. They have rarely obtained, as the
histories of their lives sufficiently establish, any due encouragement and
reward for their ingenuity and public spirit. They have often languished in
poverty, and died in neglect, while the world has derived immense wealth
from their labors, and science and the arts have reaped unbounded advantages
from their discoveries. They have but too often possessed a barren fame, and
seen the fruits of their genre gathered by those, who have not blushed to
purloin, what they have been unable to create. It is, indeed, but a poor reward,
to secure to authors and inventors, for a limited period, only, an exclusive title
to that, which is, in the noblest sense, their own property; and to require it
ever afterwards to be dedicated to the public. But, such as the provision is, it
is impossible to doubt its justice, or its policy, so far as it aims at their
protection and encouragement. 146
The authority for granting patent rights in this country began with a
Constitutional authorization of power to Congress:
Congress shall have the power . . to promote the Progress of Science and
Useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries (the "Patent
Clause"). 147
Although the IP Clause did not exist in the first draft of the Constitution,
history reports that either Madison alone, or together with Pinckney,

143

Id. at 1294 (citations omitted).
at 1285.

1 Id.
145

Id.

Joseph Story, A FamiliarExposition of the Constitution of the United States 118 (1840)
(quoting and paraphrasing the IP Clause and Federalist No. 43).
147 U.S. Const. art. I, § 1, cl.
8.
146
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submitted the subject matter of the IP Clause to committee for review. 148 The
proposed IP Clause emerged from committee in essentially the proposed
form1 49 and limited Congress' power to enacting laws for the protection of
inventions and discoveries that promote the advancement of the sciences and
useful arts. 15 0
The IP Clause granted Congress the power to enact national protection for
patents and copyrights, which was needed because then existing state
protection was inadequate.15 1 However, before ratification of the
Constitution, the only power to grant protection to authors and inventors
resided with the states. 1 52 Shifting this power from the states to the federal
government to promote national progress of the arts and sciences was critical
because of the territorial limitations of state protection and the expense
Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, Vol. 3, Section
1150 (1833) http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/al_8_8sl4.html; see also
infra note 156 and supra 214 and accompanying text. 156
149 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966); see also Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp. et al, 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974) ("The stated objective of the Constitution in granting
the power to Congress to legislate in the area of intellectual property is to 'promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts."'). The Court went on to say[t]he patent laws promote this progress by offering a right of exclusion for a limited period
as an incentive to inventors to risk the often enormous costs in terms of time, research, and
development. The productive effort thereby fostered will have a positive effect on society
through the introduction of new products and processes of manufacture into the economy,
and the emanations by way of increased employment and better lives for our citizens.
148

Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 480.

Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966); see also Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974) ("The stated objective of the in granting the power to
Congress to legislate in the area of intellectual property is to 'promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts.").
15o

Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progressof Science and Useful Arts: The
Backgroundand Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States
151

Constitution, 2 J. Intell. Prop. L. 1, 3 (1994); see also English Statute of Monopolies of
1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3
http://www.peoplesmandate.iinet.net.au/EnglishStatute-ofMonopolies 623.pdf.
152 See Walterscheid, supra note 151, at 1-2 (stating "Prior to the ratification of the
Constitution by the requisite nine states on June 21, 1788, no federal patent or copyright
law existed because under the Articles of Confederation each state retained "every power,
jurisdiction and right, which is not expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress
assembled.") (citing and quoting ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. 11, reprinted in
9 Journals of the Continental Congress 908 (Worthington C. Ford ed. 1906)); see also
James W. Ely, THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF
PROPERTY 19 (2008) (providing that early state patent codes rewarded inventors by
granting limited monopolies for inventions that were "'profitable to the Countrie.' The
colonies occasionally awarded special patents to individuals[,] [d]eclaring 'that all due
encouragement be given to ingenuity and industry when it tends to the public good,' a 1756
South Carolina act vested (...)"
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associated with obtaining protection in all states."s' For these reasons, James
Madison believed that national protection was better suited to protect rights
in inventions. 1 54

If we look to the intent of the Founding Fathers, 15 5 specifically James
Madison, 156 there is a compelling argument that Madison intended patent
protection to vest property rights in the patentee, 157 as "[t]he Founding
Fathers were deeply concerned about the protection of private property."1 5 8
They viewed property as a keystone right. 159
At the Philadelphia Convention, Madison declared that "the primary
objects of civil society are the security of property and public safety."160 In
his article 'The Impact of Concernfor the Security of PropertyRights on the
Legal System of the EarlyAmerican Republic',161 Stuart Bruchey asserted that
"[P]erhaps the most important value of the Founding Fathers (...) was their
belief in the necessity of securing property rights." 1 6 2 It is a reasonable
inference that Madison fought to include patent rights in the class of property

153
154

See Walterscheid, supra note 1 at 22-23.
James Madison, FederalistNo. 43, 288 (Jan. 23, 1778), http://press-

pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/al_8_8s7.html. (stating "The States cannot
separately make effectual provision for either of the cases [copyright and patent protection],
and most of them have anticipated the decision of this point, by laws passed at the instance
of Congress."); see Madison, The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 which
Framedthe Constitution of the United States ofAmerica, at 512-13 (1920) (Madison also
went on to argue that "the usefulness of the Congresses power to award both patents and
copyrights will scarcely be questioned."); see also FederalistNo. 43, Avalon project.
155 See Walterscheid, supra note 151,
("The four [Constitutional] Framers with relevant views on the intellectual property clause
were George Washington, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and Roger Shenan").
156 See id. at 92. (Madison's notes of August 18, 1787 reporting the day's events of the
Committee of Detail, indicated that Pinckney also submitted a proposal for inclusion of
patent protection in the Constitution).
157 See id. at 93. ("This is particularly true since he had clearly proposed that the Congress
have power to secure copyrights for authors and because he was highly interested in
protecting scholarly works); see Walterscheid, supra note 151; see supra note 154 and
accompanying text. Moreover, Madison's subsequent defense of the Intellectual Property
Clause, while not conclusive on the point, suggests that he had more than a passing interest
in this particular clause. See James Madison, FederalistNo. 43, 30
(1961) (stating 'The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned.').
15. James W. Ely, Jr., The Guardianof Every Other Right: A ConstitutionalHistory of
PropertyRights 4 (2008).
159 See Stuart Bruchey, The Impact of Concernfor the Security of PropertyRights on the
Legal System of the Early American Republic, 1980 Wisc. L.R. 1135, 1136.
160 Max Farrand, The Records of the FederalConvention of 1787, at 147 (Max Farrand ed.
1937).
161 See Bruchey, supra note
159.
162 See Bruchey, supra note 159.
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to be protected by the government because he considered patent rights the
type of property to which the government must secure rights. 163 In a letter to
the Constitutional Convention, Madison equated rights in inventions with
common law rights in copyrights. Madison Wrote:
[T]he copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain
to be a right at common law. The right to useful invention seems with equal
reason to belong to the inventors. The public good fully coincides in both
cases with the claims of individuals. 164
British law at one time considered copyrights to be common law rights. 165
However, at the time Madison wrote the Federalist No. 43, the law had
changed. 166 Whether Madison knew of the law change is of no import because
his advocated position was for common law protection for inventors. 167 The
likely impetus for Madison's position was to avoid the abuses of power to
which inventors were subject to under British law. 168 Rather than having
patent rights revoked or given to another at the whim of the ruling crown,

Madison wanted inventors' rights to be secure, with the only way to divest
inventors of their rights being through the courts at common law. 169
As previously discussed, before the passage of the Statute of Monopolies
in England, the crown had control over how and to whom it would award
patents in inventions or trade and whether rights would be enforced or
See Bruchey, supra note 159 (discussing Madison's letter to the Constitutional
convention).
163

1
165

Madison, supra notel54; see also Fenning, infra note 181.
See Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitutionof the United States, Vol. 3, Section

1150 (1833) http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/al_8_8sl4.html. (stating
"The copyright of authors in their works had, before the revolution, been decided in Great
Britain to be a common law right; and it was regulated and limited under statutes passed by
parliament upon that subject.").
166

See Oren Bracha, Commentary on the IntellectualProperty Constitutional Clause 1789,

in PRIMARY SOURCES ON COPYRIGHT (1450-1900) (L. Bently & M. Kretschmer ed. 2008)
(The case of Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2302 (1769), recognized common law copyright;
however, by 1787, the House of Lords had overturned Millar in Donaldsonv. Becket, 4
Burr. 408 (1774), rejecting the idea of common law copyright protection after publication).
167 See Walterscheid, supra note 151 at 3 (Madison was not advocating for a natural right
in inventions, as once was the case for copyrights in England.).
168

See infra Part II(a)(1); see also Robert P. Merges, The ProperScope of the Copyright

and Patent Power, 37 Harv.J. on Legis. 45, 47 (2000).
169

See Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents:An Intellectual History,

1550-1800, 52 Hastings L.J. 1255, 1291-1293 (2001) (discussing various patent cases
decided by the English law courts: Liardet v. Johnson (1778) ("The legality and justness of
the patent and specification being also proved to the satisfaction of the jury, a verdict, with
costs, was given for the plaintiffs, by which the validity of the patent is fully established."
A discussion of additional patent cases decided by the law courts is also provided (Yerbury
v. Wallace (1768), Taylor v. Lucket (1770), and Horton v. Harvey (1781)).
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invalidated. 170 These abuses of the crown more than likely guided Madison's
view of the importance of protecting inventor's rights by granting Congress
the power to award protection to authors and inventors.1 7 1 The Supreme Court
in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966), acknowledges that the
IP Clause "was written against the backdrop of the practices . . of the Crown
in granting monopolies to court favorites in goods or businesses which had
long before been enjoyed by the public." Surely, Madison would not have
wanted to re-create these problems in the new country. Rather, it would have
been Madison's goal to create a system that removed prior inequities by
having rights to inventions and discoveries vest in the inventor by law. 172
Madison deemed these rights as so significant that they warranted protection
in the Constitution. Indeed as stated by May and Cooper in their article
entitled 'The Reason and Nature of Intellectual Property: Copyright and
-

Patentin The FederalistPapers'173

Madison regarded copyright and patent as forms of property that
government is established to protect. Additionally, as Federalist No. 43 and
other numbers point out, securing an individual's IP rights, consistent with
the rules of justice, also furthers the public good by incentivizing further
investments and discoveries that promote the "progress of science and useful
arts. 174

Madison believed rights in inventions ("patent rights") to be the type of
rights that governments must protect. 171 In Madison's view, protecting
individual rights promotes the public good. 176 Madison's view makes sense,
as protecting the rights of others to their inventions and artistic expressions
provides the incentive for continued creation knowing one will reap the
rewards of his/her labor.
History is on the side of private property rights, and in honoring the
original intent of the IP Clause, the Supreme Court should hold patents to be
private property rights subject to Article III court jurisdiction to revoke,
remove or cancel rights after rights have vested in the patent owner. While an
SeeMark Lemley, Why do Juries Decide if Patents are Valid?, 99 Va. L. Rev. 1673,
1680 (stating "Particularly during the reign of James I, exclusive patent rights were granted
to favored merchants for a wide variety of common arts, including the making of playing
cards and the running of taverns."); see also Mossoff, supra notel69 at 1259.
171 See also Mossoff, supra note 169 at 1261; see Walterscheid, supra note 151.
172 See May & Cooper, The Reason and Nature of Intellectual Property:Copyright and
Patent in The FederalistPapers,Vol. 9, No. 4, 2 (January 14, 2014) (citing and quoting
Federalist No. 43 in which Madison "[ildentifies the ultimate source for copyright and
patent [protection] in an individual's natural right to the fruits of his or her own labor").
173 Id.
174 Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
175 See Madison, supra note
154.
176 Id. (stating "The public good fully coincides in both cases with the
claims of
individuals.").
170
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in-depth discussion of constitutional interpretation is beyond the scope of this

paper, honoring the Founding Fathers' intent is an important consideration in
deciding the status of patent rights. In the past, five basic sources have guided
Constitutional interpretation: (1) the text and structure of the Constitution, (2)
the intentions of those who drafted, voted to propose, or voted to ratify the
provision in question, (3) prior precedents (usually judicial), (4) the social,
political and economic consequences of alternative interpretations, and (5)

natural law. So considering and honoring the Founding Fathers' intent is not
without merit and is necessary to assess fully and completely the nature of the

rights "secured" under the IP Clause.
The Framers' intent was to have rights vest in inventors in exchange for
public disclosure of their discoveries. Even Thomas Jefferson, vehement
opposer of monopolies and the first patent administrator, agreed that patent
rights, while not rising to the level of natural rights, granted an inventor
private monopoly rights, stating:
The patent monopoly was not designed to secure to the inventor his
natural right in his discoveries. Rather, it was a reward, an inducement, to
bring forth new knowledge. The grant of an exclusive right to an invention
was the creation of society-at odds with the inherent free nature of disclosed
ideas-and was not to be freely given. Only inventions and discoveries which
furthered human knowledge, and were new and useful, justified the special

inducement of a limited private monopoly. 1 77
Now, while Jefferson believed that the patent right, in his view, is not a
natural right, we must ask why he used those specific words: "natural rights."
I believe because he was addressing arguments by others, specifically
Madison, promoting patent rights as natural rights.17 ' Despite their
disagreement as to the genesis of the rights, I believe both Jefferson and
Madison agreed that patent rights are private rights. 179 Because without the
vesting of rights as private rights, there is no consideration for the exchange
- inventor discloses, inventor granted rights.1 s0

See Graham, 383 U.S. at p. 9 (summarizing Thomas Jefferson's views on the patent
monopoly) (emphasis added); id. at 8 (quoting Thomas Letter to Oliver to Oliver Evans
(May, 1807), V Writings of Thomas Jefferson at 75-76 (Washington ed.) ("Certainly an
inventor ought to be allowed a right to the benefit of his invention for some certain time...
. Nobody wishes more than I do that ingenuity should receive a liberal encouragement.").
177

See infra notes 183-185.
See supra note 128.
18s See John C. Stedman, Invention and Public Policy, 12 DuKE L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
178

179

649, 656 (1947) ("The Government agrees to give a seventeen-year right to exclude others
in exchange for the inventor's public disclosure of his invention"); see also note 214.
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Because the language of the IP Clause emerged from Constitutional
committee review nem. con.,"' there was no report on committee debates or
discussions. So understanding what the Framers' meant by "securing" and
"rights" is key in evaluating the specific mandates of the IP Clause. The best
way to ascertain the Framers' intent demands an inquiry not only into the
Framers' intended purpose of the Clause but also historical and legal
precedent related to the development of the Clause and the application of any
resulting laws. If one does so, Constitutional interpretation leans towards
private rights. Historical precedent supports this interpretation because
despite the fact that patent rights are based on statutory authority, there is
historical support for their enforceability and validity "to be determined by
and according to the common law." 1 82
There are those that argue that the Framers, particularly Madison, "were
seeking to encode into the IP Clause a Lockean notion' of property rights
that emanated from natural law." 184 Under a natural rights view, man has a
natural property right in that which by his "labor" or "the work of his hands"
he transforms to something more than the common state Nature provided it. 18
Ayn Rand, the founder of the Objectivist movement, took the natural rights
theory of property one step further and made it clear that one's property rights
includes "right[s] to the product[s] of one's mind" - the "mental effort in the
' Karl Fenning, The Origin of the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution, 11 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 438, 442 (1929); see also infra note 214.
182 See Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progressof Science and Useful
Arts: the
Backgroundand Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States
Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L., Fall 1994, at 1, 12 (1994); see also note 133 and
accompanying text.
183 John Locke was a 17 th Century English philosopher and political theorist that believed
property ownership was a "natural right" and individuals are by nature entitled to the fruits
of their labor. See John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, ChapterV, Section 27
(1690).
184 Alexander J. Kasner, The OriginalMeaning of ConstitutionalInventors: Resolving the
Unanswered Question of the MadStad Litigation, 68 Stan. L. Rev. Online 24, 30 (2015);
see also Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents:An IntellectualHistory,
1550-1800, 52 Hastings L.J. 1255, 1294 (2001) (expressing the view that shifting patent
rights adjudication from the Privy Council to the common law courts brought in a new
perspective for viewing patent rights because "common law judges in the eighteenth
century were more likely to approach this issue from a theoretical framework of natural
rights, including social contract notions and John Locke's labor theory of property.").
185 John Locke, Two Treaties of Civil Government, Chapter V, Section 27 (1689, 1764)
(property rights and ownership acquired through added labor), 32-33 (appropriating or
acquiring rights in land occurs by subduing, tilling and sowing any part of it, thereby
annexing to it something that is one's property - the work of his/her labor), 44-45
(transformation of land through labor ("art and invention") for the "conveniences of life"
gives a property right)). See Online Library of Liberty, available at,
http://oll.libertyfund.org/pages/john-locke-two-treatises-1689).
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production of material values." 18 6 The purpose of government is "to protect
property of every sort; as well that which lies in the various rights of
individuals (...) that alone is a just government, which impartially secures to
every man, whatever is his own."1 8 7
Several courts and scholars of the era also embraced a natural rights view
of patent rights. Adam Mossoff shares a few illustrative examples in his essay,

Why IntellectualProperty Rights? A Lockean Justification (May 2015).8'
These natural "right[s] cannot be denied without denying an inherent
aspect of a person's humanity."

18 9

They are fundamental or unalienable

private rights that convey a right in property "consistent with the laws of
nature and of nature's God (...) to acquire, possess or transfer property." 190
Sir William Blackstone, author of The Commentaries on Laws of
England, proposed another theory of legal rights to property based on a moral

right that exists as an antecedent to the state's rights. Blackstone's
Commentaries were well-known in America and would have influenced
colonial law, as the number sold in American nearly equaled that sold in

186
187

Ayn Rand, Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal, p. 130 (1966).
James Madison, Property, The Founders'Constitution, Vol.1, Ch. 16, Doc.23 (March

29, 1792), http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/vlchl6s23.html.
18

Adam Mossoff, Why IntellectualLPropertlRights?A Lockea Justification,LAW AND
(May 4, 2015) http://www.libertylawsite.org/liberty-forum/why-intellectual-

LIBERTY

property-rights-a-lockean-justification/. Below are excerpts from Mossoff s article of courts
and scholars arguing for a Lockean view of intellectual property rights:
In his famous 1826 treatise, Commentarieson American Law, Chancellor James Kent . .
argues for the Lockean principle that 'It is just that [authors and inventors] should enjoy the
pecuniary profits resulting from mental as well as bodily labor.'[21] James
Kent, Commentarieson American Law, vol. 2 (Little, Brown & Co., 12th edition, 1873):
474.

As 19th century judges were wont to say, the patent laws ensured that an inventor would
'enjoy the fruits of his invention.'[22] Hawes v. Gage, 11 F. Cas. 867, 867 (C.C.N.D.N.Y.
1871) (No. 6237).
[O]ne judge in 1843 explained that it is 'difficult to draw a distinction between the fruits of
mental and physical labor' and that this is a key reason why the patent laws provide that 'a
man should be secured in the fruits of his ingenuity and labor.'[23] Brooks v. Bicknell, 4 F.
Cas. 247, 251 (C.C.D. Ohio 1843) (No. 1944). [24] For additional examples, see Mossoff,
"The Use and Abuse of IP at the Birth of the Administrative State," 2022-2024; Mossoff,
"Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents?," 990-998; Mossoff, "Patents
as Constitutional Private Property," 705-707 & 718-719.
189

Richard A. Huenefeld, The UnalienableRight of Property:Its Foundation, Erosion and

Restoration, 8 Journal of Christian Jurisprudence 147, 154 (p. 7 of reprint) (1990).
190

Id.
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England. 19 1 However, because of Blackstone's harsh view of colonists' rights,
the colonists may have received his views less positively than Locke's views.
Blackstone proposed a theory of property ownership based on "personal
occupancy" and the "personal labor" of the occupant, whereby the occupant
through one's personal labor creates a new or improved thing the laborer
acquires ownership rights in the thing. 192 Blackstone also supported a social
compact theory, asserting that civil laws were necessary to resolve any
conflicts of ownership or enjoyment. 193 Unlike Locke, Blackstone believed
that in civil societies "all property is derived from society," and "government
had power to limit these rights [natural rights] for the benefit of the
community." 19 4 Blackstone fashioned this belief on the notion that "human
laws can appropriately restrict natural rights" because "everyone in society
had bargained away a portion of her rights by entering into an imaginary
contract" in becoming a member of civil society. 195
Although Blackstone echoed Locke's views that the immutable laws of
nature endowed one with rights to personal security, liberty, and property,
"Blackstone's understanding of property rights differed from Locke's and
closely resembled that of the Scottish Enlightenment," which saw
government limitation of natural private rights as permissible. 196 However,
with regard to intellectual property, Blackstone states:
There is still another species of property, which, (if it subsists by the
common law) being grounded on labour and invention, is more properly
reducible to the head of occupancy than any other; since the right of
occupancy itself is supposed by Mr. Locke, and many others, to be founded

191 See Albert W. Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone, 145 Univ. Penn. L. Rev. 1 (1996)
(citing 2 Edmund Burke, Speech on Moving His Resolutionsfor Conciliationwith the
Colonies (Mar. 22, 1775), in The Works Of The Right Honorable Edmund Burke 99, 125
(rev. ed., Boston, Little Brown 1865). (Burke concluded that the study of law was one of
the circumstances that had engendered "a fierce spirit of liberty" among the colonists.)).
192 See Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England in FourBooks, Vol.
I, Chapter 26: Of Title to Things by PersonalOccupancy, Section 405 (1793),
http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/blackstone-commentaries-on-the-laws-of-england-in-fourbooks-vol-1.
193 Richard A. Huenefeld, The UnalienableRight of Property:Its Foundation, Erosion and
Restoration, 8 J. Christian Jurisprudence 147, 167-168 (1990), (citing 1 William
Blackstone, Commentaries at 138, 140, 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries at 3, 8.).
194 See Alschuler supra note 191 at 29-30.
195 Id. at 30.
196 See id. at 23 (citing Frederick G. Whelan, Property as Artifice: Hume and Blackstone, in
NOMOS XXII: PROPERTY 101, 101 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980)
("Hume and Blackstone are fundamentally similar in their manner of conceptualizing and
justifying the institution [of property] ... and in this they stand in marked contrast to
Locke").
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on the personal labour of the occupant. And this is the right which an author
may be supposed to have in his own original literary composition: so that no
other person without his leave may publish or make profit of the copies. When
a man by the exertion of his rational powers has produced an original work,
he seems to have clearly a right to dispose of that identical work as he pleases,
and any attempt to vary the disposition he has made of it appears to be an
invasion of that right. 197

From this passage, one could infer that Blackstone deviates from Locke's
theory concerning all private property except intellectual property. If so,
intellectual property rights under both perspectives rise to the level of
fundamental private rights that must be subject to the rights and protections
of Article III of the Constitution.
If patents are private property rights viewed from a Lockean or
Blackstonian perspective, which I assert they are, this property should be
treated like all other property to which an owner holds unalienable private

rights. The Supreme Court's decision in McCormick HarvestingMachine Co.
v. Aultman19 8 would then be correct. There the Court held that once the PTO

issues a patent, jurisdiction over its validity passes "beyond the control and
jurisdiction of [the issuing] office [the PTO], and is not subject to be revoked

or cancelled by the President, or any other officer of the Government."

199

So

in essence, private rights attach and no "officer of the Government" may
revoke those rights without resort to "authority competent to set a patent
aside, or to annul it, or to correct it for any reasons whatever' - which

competent authority being the "courts of the United States, not the department

-

which issued the patent." 200 Patent rights are not only private property rights
but also unalienable rights.
Also, under a natural rights view, an inventor's rights are superior to the
rights of the public. 20 1 Daniel Webster arguing from a Lockean perspective
before the House of Representatives in 1824 stated that
the right of the inventor is a high property; it is the fruit of his mind-it
belongs to him more than any other property-he does not inherit it-he takes
it by no man's gift-it peculiarly belongs to him, and he ought to be protected
in the enjoyment of it. 202

197

See supra note 192 at 405-06.

198

169 U.S. 606 (1898).

199
200

Id. at 608-09.
Id. at 609.
See supra note 185, sections 27, 44 -45.

201

202

41 ANNALS OF CONG. 934 (1824).
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Webster was not alone in his thinking. Many of his colleagues, early
American inventorS 203 and other lawyerS 204 agreed with him.
Now, one must balance Madison et al.'s natural rights theory of
intellectual property rights against Thomas Jefferson's utilitarianism privilege
view. Jefferson believed that the grant of rights in intellectual property, e.g.,
patents and copyrights, was a special monopoly privilege bestowed on man
by the government to support social welfare. 205 He "[c]onsider[ed] the
exclusive right to inventions as given not of natural right, but for the benefit
of society." 206 Jefferson believed that society (government) could confer on
Kasner, 68 Stan.L.Rev. at 30 (quoting Early American inventor John Fitch considering
the awarding of patents as a "matter of property and as a matter of right."); see also id. at
note 43 (citing Oren Bracha, Owning Ideas: A History of Anglo-American Intellectual
Property) 404-05 (June 2005); see unpublished S.J.D. thesis, Harvard Law School (quoting
Frank D. Prager, The Steamboat Interference 1787-1793, 40 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 611, 633
(1958)) (internal quotation mark omitted), available at http://www.utexas.edu/law/faculty
/obracha/dissertation)); Id.
203

204

Adam Mossoff, The Use and Abuse of IP at the Birth of the Administrative State, 157

University of Pennsylvania Law Review 2001 (2009), fn. 114 (citing Hawes v. Gage, 11 F.
Cas. 867, 867 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1871) (No. 6237); see also Birdsall v. McDonald, 3 F. Cas.
441, 444 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1874) (No. 1434) ("Patent laws are founded on the policy of
giving to [inventors] remuneration for the fruits, enjoyed by others, of their labor and their
genius."); Middletown Tool Co. v. Judd, 17 F. Cas. 276, 278 (C.C.D. Conn. 1867) (No.
9536) (recognizing that the patent laws secure even "the fruit of a very small amount of
inventive skill"); Clark Patent Steam & Fire Regulator Co. v. Copeland, 5 F. Cas. 987, 988
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 2866) ("Congress has wisely provided by law that inventors
shall exclusively enjoy, for a limited season, the fruits of their inventions."); Davoll v.
Brown, 7 F. Cas. 197, 199 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 3662) (explaining that the law
"protect[s] intellectual property, the labors of the mind, productions and interests as much a
man's own, and as much the fruit of his honest industry, as the wheat he cultivates, or the
flocks he rears"); Brooks v. Bicknell, 4 F. Cas. 247, 251 (C.C.D. Ohio 1843) (No. 1944)
(stating that "a man should be secured in the fruits of his ingenuity and labor" and that "it
seems difficult to draw a distinction between the fruits of mental and physical labor");
McKeever v. United States, 14 Ct. Cl. 396, 420 (1878) (quoting an unnamed constitutional
commentator that the Copyright and Patent Clause in Article I, Section 8, secures to authors
and inventors "a natural right to the fruits of mental labor")).
205 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 13 The Writings
of Thomas Jefferson 326, 334-35 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1903) ("It would be curious
then, if an idea, the fugitive fermentation of an individual brain, could, of natural right, be
claimed in exclusive and stable property. If nature has made any one thing less susceptible
than all others of exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking power called an idea,
which an individual may exclusively possess as long as he keeps it to himself.... Society
may give an exclusive right to the profits arising from them, as an encouragement to men to
pursue ideas which may produce utility, but this may or may not be done, according to the
will and convenience of the society, without claim or complaint from anybody.")
206 See id., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 13 The
Writings of Thomas Jefferson 326, 335 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds.,
1903). For background on the importance of Jefferson's work and views on patents to
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man an exclusive right to the "profits" arising from his or her intellectual

-

property as an encouragement to pursue inventions and creations that benefit
society.2 0 7 Jefferson, thus, rejected the natural rights view and instead
espoused a utilitarianism privilege view, which the US Supreme Court later
validated as the prevailing historical policy underpinnings for intellectual
property protection in the United States. 208 Although Jefferson did not believe
patent rights were natural rights, he did believe that the right was a private
right, as expressed in his letter to McPherson calling the grant a private
monopoly.20 9
Despite Jefferson's vehement opposition to monopolies of any kind, 2 10 he
had a change of heart regarding patent rights in 1789.211 In a letter to James
Madison, Jefferson stated in response to the proposed Bill of Rights,
"[m]onopolies may be allowed to persons for their own productions in
literature and their own inventions in the arts for a term not exceeding
years but for no longer term and no other purpose." 212 Also, as one of the first
administrators of the Patent Act, responsible for reviewing patent
applications, Jefferson said -An act of Congress authorising the issuing patents for new discoveries has
given a spring to invention beyond my conception. Being an instrument in
granting the patents, I am acquainted with their discoveries. Many of them
indeed are trifling, but there are some of great consequence which have been
proved by practice, and others which if they stand the same proof will produce
great effect.21 3
Supreme Court interpretation, see Edward C. Walterscheid, The Use and Abuse of History:
The Supreme Court's Interpretation of Thomas Jefferson's Influence on the Patent Law, 39
IDEA 195, 200-01 (1999).).
207 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 n.2 (citation omitted); see also Letter to Isaac
McPherson, supra note 206, at 333-34.
208 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989).
209

See supra note 177.

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Madison (July 31, 1788), Papers of Thomas Jefferson,
13:442-43, available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/vlchl4s46.html
(Jefferson reasserted his view that the Constitution should preclude all monopolies,
including those in patents and copyrights); see also Id. ("it is better . . to abolish . .
monopolies, in all cases than to do it in any.").
211 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Madison (August 28, 1789), Papers of Thomas
Jefferson, 15:368, Transcription available at Founders Online,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-15-02-0354.
210

212

Id.

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Benjamin Vaughn (June 27, 1790), in Papers of
Thomas Jefferson, 16:579, Transcription available at Founders Online,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-16-02-0342. However, in 1814, it
seems as though Jefferson had another change of mind regarding the appropriateness of
213
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Since there was little debate on the "rights" provision of IP Clause, 2 14
determining whether the Jefferson's theory or the natural rights view of
intellectual property rights attaches was then, and continues to be, the subject
of legal debate.
Under either Jefferson's or Madison's theory, the Constitution, and later
codifying statutes, grant individuals both patent and copyright protection for
their inventions and creations. 2 15 Whether based on natural rights or
Jefferson's utilitarianism theory, both theories reward individuals for their
creations and inventions by reserving to the individual an exclusive right to
their creations and inventions for a limited time. 2 16 Under Jefferson's theory,
the government grants this exclusivity "as an encouragement to men to pursue
ideas which may produce utility... "217 Under natural rights, the invention
itself creates the right. 2 18 Both philosophies reward individuals for creations
or inventions that promote the advancement of the useful arts and sciences as

-

-

patent protection, writing
England was, until we copied her, the only country on earth which ever, by a general law,
gave a legal right to the exclusive use of an idea. In some other countries it is sometimes
done, in a great case, and by a special and personal act, but, generally speaking, other
nations have thought that these monopolies produce more embarrassment than advantage to
society; and it may be observed that the nations which refuse monopolies of invention, are
as fruitful as England in new and useful devices
A man has a right to use a saw, an axe, a plane, separately; may he not combine their uses
on the same piece of wood? He has a right to use his knife to cut his meat, a fork to hold it;
may a patentee take from him the right to combine their use on the same subject? Such a
law, instead of enlarging our conveniences, as was intended, would most fearfully abridge
them, and crowd us by monopolies out of the use of the things we have.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Oliver Evans, (January 16, 1814); published in The
Writings of Thomas Jefferson (1905) Vol. 13, p. 66.
214 See Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought about Patents
Reevaluating the Patent Privilege in HistoricalContext, 92 Cornell L. Rev. 952, 978 n.120
(2005) (citing "The constituent elements of what became the Copyright and Patent Clause
were proposed as various separately listed congressional powers on August 18, 1787, at
which time they were referred to the Committee on Detail without any discussion. See THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 321-22, 324-35 (Max
Farrand ed., 1911). (The Committee presented the final version of the Copyright and Patent
Clause to the Convention on September 5, 1787 and Madison's notes reflect that the "clause
was agreed to nem. con" (without debate); Id. at 509-10; But see Dotan Oliar, Making Sense
of the Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion of Progressas a Limitation on Congress's
Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO. L. J. 1771, 1781-1818 (2006) (analyzing the
Constitutional Convention record and concluding that the Clause's original meaning can be
determined based on its textual structure and the proposals that led to it))."
215 See supra note 105 (IP Clause).
216 See supra notes 160-170, 206-207 and accompanying
text.
217 See supra note at 206, Letter from Thomas Jefferson
to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13,
1813).
218 See supra note 183.
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-

the Constitution intended. 2 19 The main difference is the genesis of the right
natural versus bestowed. But as discussed above, it is quite reasonable to

believe that Jefferson also believed this "bestowed" right to be a private
right. 220
The modern view of the purpose of the IP Clause fully supports the
reasoning of both Jefferson and Madison, which is to award authors and
inventors exclusive rights for a limited time to their creations and discoveries
in exchange for disclosing them to the public. 22 1 As the Supreme Court has
opined, "[t]he stated objective of the Constitution in granting the power to
Congress to legislate in the area of intellectual property is to 'promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts." 222 More specifically the Court states
that -[t]he patent laws promote this progress by offering a right of exclusion for
a limited period as an incentive to inventors to risk the often enormous costs
in terms of time, research, and development. The productive effort thereby
fostered will have a positive effect on society through the introduction of new
products and processes of manufacture into the economy, and the emanations
by way of increased employment and better lives for our citizens. 223
Thus, securing rights to inventors to encourage disclosures was the
intended purpose of the IP Clause, with disclosure intended to promote the
literary and technological advancement of society. 224 For this to work, the
Founding Fathers intended that inventor's rights be "secure" - that is treated
like other property rights. 225 The clear intent of the securing of rights to
inventors was to provide greater protection than the English crown had

219

See supra note 217.

See supra note 177, 178 and accompanying text.
www.copyright.org ("Both perceived copyrights and patents as state granted monopolies
that, despite the general aversion to monopolies, could be justified due to their public
utility").
222 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974).
223 Id.; see also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("The economic philosophy
behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction
that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public
welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful
Arts."); Universal Oil Products Co. v. Global Oil Refining Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484
(1944)("As a reward for inventions and to encourage their disclosure, the United States
offers a seventeen-year monopoly to an inventor who refrains from keeping his invention a
trade secret.").
224 See supra note 177 and accompanying
text.
225 See supra note 180 and accompanying
text.
220

221
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provided, whereby the Crown could strip away patent rights on a whim, as
discussed at notes 171 and accompanying text and Graham, 383 U.S. at 5-6.
B. The Evolution of United States PatentActs
On July 2, 1788, the states ratified the U.S. Constitution, 226 and just two
years later, Congress enacted the first Patent Act, The Patent Act of 1790.227
While nothing in the Constitution compels Congress to award inventors
protection in the form of patents, Congress has consistently made patent
protection available to inventors since passage of the 1790 Patent Act as
discussed in this section. Congress' quick passage of the first Patent Act
speaks volumes about the importance of patent protection to the founding
fathers, as well as their understanding of the importance of promoting the
useful arts by incentivizing inventors to disclosure their discoveries. 228 And
although not a Founding Father but of the early generations to reap the
benefits of a robust patent system, Abraham Lincoln said, "the patent system
added the fuel of interest to the fire of genius." 2 2 9 He went on to describe "the
patent law as one of the three most important developments 'in the world's
history,' along with the discovery of America and the perfection of [the]
printing [press]. '230
The 1790 Patent Act included two statutory requirements, novelty, and
utility as the threshold requirements qualifying an invention for patent
protection, although the examiners rarely enforced the utility provision. 23 1
This first Patent Act was highly ministerial in nature, and over time proved to
be too time-consuming for the three cabinet secretaries. 232 Each had to review
Resolution of Congress, Dated July 2, 1788, Submitting Ratifications of the Constitution
to a Committee (Reprinted from Documentary History of the Constitution, Vol. 11 (1894),
pp. 161-162 available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th century/ressub03.asp ).
226

227

Graham, 383 U.S. at 6; see also Bruce Bugbee, The Genesis ofAmerican Patentand

Copyright Law, Public Affairs Press (Washington, D.C., 1967) (for a historical overview of
the U.S. Patent System; see also Walterscheid.
228 See supra note 129 and accompanying
text.
229 See Mary Bellis, A Patentfor President(March
17, 2017), available at,
https://www.thoughtco.com/patent-for-president-lincoln-1992096.
230
231

Id.
See B. Kahn, Innovations in Intellectual Property, Systems and Economic Development,

Department of Economics, Bowdoin College and the National Bureau of Economic
Research p. 17 n. 54, available at http://economics of
.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/Workshops-Seminars/Economic-History/khan-020328.pdf;
see also Craig A. Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, Boston University

Law Review, Vol. 90:51, 58 n. 27 (2010) (citing the Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109,
110 (repealed 1793)); see also Id. at 64 the 1790 Patent Act included an examination
process, including novelty, utility and disclosure requirements).
232 Secretary of State (Thomas Jefferson), the Attorney General and the Secretary
of War
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each patent application, in addition to their other duties, and vote on the
patentability of each invention, with a majority vote required to issue the
patent.23 3
Thomas Jefferson, then Secretary of State, was the first patent
administrator and author of the second Patent Act, (the 1793 Patent Act). 23 4
Although Jefferson initially was vehemently opposed to monopolies of any
kind,23 5 his position softened slightly on patents.2 36
In 1793, the judiciary assumed administration of the patent system with

the intent that the Patent System would "be matured in a system under which
every one might know when his actions were safe and lawful." 2 37 Under this
system, district courts determined patent validity, which included "the power

to set in motion a process that could end in the repeal of the patent." 2 38 By the
1830s, administration of the patent system became too cumbersome for the
judiciary, and in 1836 Congress created the Patent Office. 239 To provide for
reviewed patent applications; see id. at 18; see also Robert P. Merges, The ProperScope of
the Copyright and Patent Power, 37 Harv.J. on Legis. 45, 49-50 (2000).
233

234

See Graham, 383 U.S. at 6-7.
Jefferson, a prolific inventor, was however very adverse to monopolies of any kind. In

-

fact

He rejected a natural rights theory in intellectual property rights and clearly recognized the
social and economic rationale of the patent system. The patent monopoly was not designed
to secure to the inventor his natural right in his discoveries. Rather, it was a reward, an
inducement, to bring forth new knowledge. The grant of an exclusive right to an invention
was the creation of society - at odds with the inherent free nature of disclosed ideas - and
was not to be freely given.
235

Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. at 8-9; see also Writing of Thomas Jefferson at

180-81 (Washington ed.) (Letter to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 1813)); see also Lemley, Mark
A., Why Do Juries Decide If Patents are Valid? (August 5, 2013). Stanford Public Law

Working Paper No. 2306152. Available at
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2306152 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssm.2306152, n. 80
(citing Patent Act of 1790, Ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-112 (April 10, 1790); see P.J. Federico,
Operation of the Patent Act of 1790, 18 J. Pat. Ofc. Soc'y 237 (1936)) (discussion of the
act).
236 In a letter to Oliver Evans, Jefferson wrote:
Certainly an inventor ought to be allowed a right to the benefit of his invention for some
certain time. Nobody wishes more than I do that ingenuity should receive a liberal
encouragement.
Letter to Oliver Evans (May 1807), V Writings of Thomas Jefferson, at 75-76 (Washington
ed.).
237 Graham, 383 U.S. at
10.
238
239

Id.
See B. Zorina Khan, Innovations in Intellectual Property Systems and Economic

Development, Department of Economics, Bowdoin College and the National Bureau of
Economic Research, p. 18, available at
http://economics.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/Workshops-Seminars/EconomicHistory/khan-020328.pdf.
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checks and balances and "to constrain the ability of [patent] examiners to
engage in arbitrary actions, the applicant was given the right to file a bill in
equity to contest the decisions of the Patent Office with the further right of
appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States." 2 40
The next major amendment to the Patent Act came in 1952.241 The 1952
Patent Act represents the basic foundation on which the modern-day patent
law rests. The 1952 Act introduced Section 103 which required an invention
to be nonobvious when compared to the prior art. Finally, the America Invents
Act ("AIA"), 242 which became effective on September 16, 2011, marks the
most substantial changes in United States Patent Law since 1952.
The intent of the AIA was to weed out "the worst patents, which probably
never should have been issued."24 3 The belief being "that additional and more
rigorous procedures in the Patent Office [for reexamining issued patents]
[would] improve the quality of the issued patents and thus promote the
public's confidence in issued patents and patentees' confidence in their
property rights."2 4 4 Unfortunately, IPRs have proven to have the opposite
effect on the faith and confidence the United States Patent System.
C. Conclusion to Part II
Under British law, the Statute of Monopolies conferred common law
protections upon patent rights, 245 and many historians and authors consider
the Statute of Monopolies to be the foundation upon which patent rights in
the United States stand.24 6 So, it follows that the Founding Fathers intended
240

Id.
The 1952 Patent Act was authored by Giles Rich, who later served a combined 43 years
as an appeals court judge on the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the CAFC, and
Pasquale Joseph Federico, who was a high ranking official at the PTO.
241

242 See supra note 4.

157 CONG.REC. S7413 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (reading into
the Record a letter from Lamar Smith, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee).
21 See Gregory Doulin, DUBIOUS PATENT REFORM, 56 Boston College Law Rev. 881,
882 (2015) (citing Patent Policy: Hearings on H.R. 4564 Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Civil Liberties & the Admin. of Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
44 (1982) (statement of Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks);
126 CONG. REC. 29,895 (1980) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier)).
245 See Section 2, Statute of Monopolies, supra Part II(A)(a)(1) and n. 136; see also Graham
v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966) ("The Patent Clause ... was written against the
backdrop of the practices-eventually curtailed by the Statute of Monopolies - of the
Crown granting monopolies to court favorites in goods or businesses....").
246 Mark Lemley, Why do Juries Decide ifPatents are Valid?, 99 Va. L. Rev. 1673, 1678
(2013) (stating "English and American patent practice diverged in important respects soon
after 1791, so the focus on English practice is significant."); see also Adam Mossoff,
Rethinking the Development of Patents:An Intellectual History, 1550-1800, 52 Hastings L.
243
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the common law provisions of the Statute of Monopolies should also apply to
U.S. patent rights. 24 7 As a result of this historical precedent, patent rights
occupy a unique place in United States intellectual property law, having both
civil and common law attributes. 24 8
Yes, patent rights originate from a statutory scheme authorized by the
Constitution.2 4 9 The Constitution specifically directs the what (writings and
discoveries that promote the sciences and useful arts) and the how (secure
rights to authors and inventors for a limited time) of protecting these rights. 250
The Constitution does not direct the protection of any other rights enumerated
in Article I in this manner. 25 1 And the subsequent judicial treatment of these
rights elevated them to the status of private rights on par with rights in
physical (real) property.25 2
From a historical perspective, the intent of the IP Clause and subsequently
enacted laws was to reward inventors for their effort, not the public which
would benefit upon expiration of patent rights. 253 Thus, the birth of the patent
J. 1259-76 (2001) (providing a historical account of the development of patent rights in
England the United States).
See supra note 151.
See generally, The Common Law and Civil Law Traditions in The Robbins Collection
(Boalt Hall), U.C. at Berkley SCH. of L.,
247
248

https://www.law.berkeley.edu/library/robbins/CommonLawCivilLawTraditions.html.
249
250

See supra note 227.
See Jeanne C. Fromer, The Intellectual Property Clause'sExternal Limitations, 61:7

Duke L. J. 1329, 1332 (2012) (stating "the IP Clause's history indicates that Congress
cannot use other means to promote the specified end of promoting the progress of science
and useful arts. For one thing, the Framers rejected other possible means of achieving this
end, such as the ability to award grants and prizes") (citing Jeanne C. Fromer, The
Intellectual Property Clause's Preemptive Effect, in Intellectual Property and the Common
Law (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., forthcoming 2012)).
251 See Cascades Projection LLC v. Epson America, Inc., 864 F.3d 1309, 1314 (Reyna, J.,
dissenting) (stating "The Patent Clause is unique in several aspects. It grants Congress
authority in such particularized detail to render the clause an imperative: to secure an
exclusive right. And of the many clauses in Section 8, this is the only one to specify not
only the ends (promotion of the progress of science and the useful arts) but the means
(issuance of patents)"); see also Edward C. Walterscheid, Conforming the General Welfare
Clause and the Intellectual Property Clause, 13:1 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 87, 90, 123, 127 (Fall

1999).
See 35 U.S.C § 161 (stating "[s]ubject to the provisions of this title, patents shall have
the attributes of personal property. . ."); see also Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S.
562, 576 n. 11 (1972) (describing patents as "a constitutionally protected property right").
253 See Whitney et al. v. Emmett et al., 29 F.Cas. 1074, 1831 (stating "[w]ith the
constitution, the English statute and the adjudication upon it before them, Congress have
declared the intention of the law to be to promote the progress of the useful arts by the
benefits granted to inventors; not by those accruing to the public, after the patent had
expired, as in England. This is most evident from their imposing as conditions, that the
invention must be new to all the world, and the patentee be a citizen of the United States. If
252
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system in the United States grew out of a statutory construction enacted by a
constitutionally empowered Congress. Unlike common law 2 54 rights, patent
rights exist because of enacted laws. 255 Despite the government origin of
patent rights, some would argue that although "patents are issued by the
federal government pursuant to constitutional authority, they have clear
common law antecedents" 256 and are not "mere artifacts of a federal
regulatory scheme" but are property rights. 257 This tension between the
government grant of rights and common law antecedents set up the basis for
the public versus private rights conflict. But if read together, historical and
Supreme Court precedents teach that patent rights also hold common law
status, subjecting them to adjudication by Article III courts to revoke, repeal
or cancel rights vested therein.
Despite Supreme Court precedent, the AIA now allows the PTO to
adjudicate patent validity issues in the first instance. The reasoning behind the

public benefit had been the sole object, it was immaterial where the invention originated, or
by whom invented; but being for the benefit of the patentee, the meritorious cause was
invention, not importation, and the benefit was not extended to foreigners, in which respects
the law had been otherwise settled in England.")
254 The body of law based on judicial decisions and customs. See www.Dictionary.com; see
also Craig A. Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U. L. Rev., at 51,
53 n.7 (2010) (defining common law as including "non-statutory, judge-made law, which
includes statutory interpretation and gap-filling").
255 See Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 477, 494 (1851) (stating "[t]he [patent]
monopoly did not exist at common law, and the rights, therefore, which may be exercised
under it cannot be regulated by the rules of the common law." The patent monopoly "is
created by the act of Congress, and no rights can be acquired in it unless authorized by
statute, and in the manner the statute prescribes"); see also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel
Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 n.5 (1964).
256 See Petitionfor Writ of Certiorari, MCM Portfolio LLC. v. Hewlett-Packard, et al., 812
F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (stating "Indeed, this Court continues to cite English cases in its
interpretation of, for example, 35 U.S.C. § 101. See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012) (citing Neilson v. Harford, Webster's
Patent Cases 295, 371 (1841), for its rule that patentable subject matter cannot extend to
laws of nature, natural phenomena an abstract ideas); cf. Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1,
18 (1829) ("It is obvious to the careful inquirer, that many of the provisions of our patent
act are derived from the principles and practice which have prevailed in the construction of
that of England . . . . The language of that clause of the statute is not, as we shall presently
see, identical with ours; but the construction of it adopted by the English courts, and the
principles and practice which have long regulated the grants of their patents, as they must
have been known and are tacitly referred to in some of the provisions of our own statute,
afford materials to illustrate it.)"); see also Mossoff, supra note 140 at 1292-94 (discussing
English law courts treatment of patent rights as common law rights); see also PartII,
subsection a-c, supra.
257 See supra note 64.
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AIA was to allow the PTO to check the quality of its work, which would
benefit both inventors and society. However, this quality check should happen
before rights vest, so, ideally, it would happen during the examination phase
as discussed in Part III, not after patent issuance.
PART III - QUALITY REVIEW
A. Nascent Rights versus Vested Rights and the Public Interest
Quality review is an important part of any process where a
producer/manufacturer makes products or services available for public use
and consumption or for those products/services that may impact public health,

safety or welfare. 258 The focus of any quality control program "should be
aimed at the needs of the consumer, present and future" because it is the
consumer that trusts that the thing received is fit for its particular purpose. 259

Critical questions like, "[w]hat does the [consumer] need" and "[h]ow can we
be useful to her/him" should drive the producer/manufacturer's deliverable. 260
Patents fall into the category of things that should be subject to a quality
control provisions, because patent exclusions impact the public welfare by

removing protected inventions

from

public use with the patentee's

261

permission.
In the world of patents, what the consumer-patent owner
needs/wants are issued patents that are more likely than not to withstand a
validity challenge before the PTO or in a court of law. 262 However, because
patent rights consist of both nascent and vested rights, the timing of the quality
review is important.2 63
Nascent rights fall within the purview of the PTO because during
examination, and before issuance, the responsibility rests with the PTO to
Qyou Stoval, Quality Control Methods (updated Sept. 26, 2017),
https://bizfluent.com/list-7635703-quality-control-methods.html.
259 See W. Edward Deming, Out of the Crisis, Ch. 1, p. 5 (MIT Press
1992).
260 Id. at Chapter 6, p. 174-75.
261 See supra note 151 at p. 1-2.
262 In a June 14, 2017 blog article by Steve Brachman and Gene Quinn entitled Are 90% of
258

Patents Challengedat the PTAB Invalid?, available at,

http://www.ipwatchdog.coni2017/06/14/90-percent-patents-challenged-ptabdefective/id=84343/, the authors report that 92% of all patents challenged in a PTAB
proceeding are defective, and "[a]t least 84 percent of patents reaching a final written
decision in a PTAB validity challenge are adjudicated to have at least one invalid claim
(usually many more than one claim), with 69 percent having all claims invalid"; see also
Brian Love, Shawn P. Miller, and Shawn Ambwani, Determinants of Patent Quality:
Evidencefrom Inter PartesReview Proceedings (2018), available at:

https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs/949
263 See supra note 61; see also infra notes 283, 284 and accompanying
text.

153

PUBLIC PRIVATE PATENT DEBATE

Vol. 9:2

ensure that the invention under examination satisfies the requirements for
patentability. 26 4 During the examination period, the patent application owner
may publicize its nascent rights by placing the label "patent pending" on the
article described and claimed in the patent application. 26 5 No rights attach,
however, until the PTO declares that all requirements for patentability have
been met. 266 It is only after the PTO issues the patent that rights vest in the

-

patent owner.26 7
Given the public interest in patents (promotion of the useful arts and
sciences) 268 , the PTO should indeed have the ability to assess whether it has
properly granted a patent. But in view of the private interest created by a
patent grant, the timing of any PTO quality review must be timed so as not to
impact a patentee's private rights. 269 Currently, IPR and other post-grant
reviews addressing patent validity come after rights have attached. So to
overcome the vested rights problem during an IPR, I propose conducting IPR
review before rights vest.
There is no disputing that the public has an interest in the PTO granting
valid patent rights, and the PTO should have the ability to assess whether it
has properly granted a patent.270 In other words, the PTO should have the right
to quality check its work. A typical quality control plan includes
a system for verifying and maintaining a desired level of quality in an
existing product or service by careful planning, use of proper equipment,
continued inspection, and corrective action as required.2 7 1
But quality processes normally occur before a company places the product
or service in public use. 27 2 In the case of patents, conducting the quality
See
See
266 See
267 Id.
268 See
269 See
264

265

supra notes 24, 61 and accompanying text.
supra note 33.
supra note 34.

supra note 77 and accompanying text.
supra note 243 at 883 (Time of post-issuance review matters. "A particular problem
for the stability of patent rights is the presence of post-issuance procedures that can be used
to invalidate already issued patents. The timing and scope of such procedures, which have
been around for quite a long time in both the United States and around the world, matters a
great deal."); see also Stephen H. Frishauf, Oppositions, 4 APLA Q. J. 93 (1976)
(discussing a longstanding patent opposition proceeding used throughout the world).
270 See Cascades Projection LLC, 864 F.3d at 1310 (Newman, J. concurring)(" There is, of
course, a public interest in the innovation incentive of the patent law . . "); see also note 9.
271 See Dictionary.com, available at, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/quality-control.
272 See Control Plan Development, available at, https://quality-one.com/control-plan/;
see
also The Difference between Quality Assurance and Quality Control, available at,
http://www.differencebetween.info/difference-between-quality-assurance-and-quality-
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review prior to public use equates to conducting the quality review before
rights vest. The reexamination process and now IPR proceedings allow the
PTO to quality check its decisions after rights vest, resulting in revocation,
cancellation or annulment of a patentee's vested patent rights. 27 3 This is out
of step with typical quality control processes and undermines faith in the
patent system, 274 as more inventors are beginning to withhold their
innovations in secret rather than seek patent protection.2 75 Once a patent
issues, rights attach, which means the patentee receives a vested private
interest in the property - the claimed invention. 276 Consistent with the
"securing rights" requirement of the IP Clause, inventors need assurances that
their property rights are protected - that is, their private rights cannot be
divested except by an Article III court.2 77

&

-

control (quality control "requires that each product that is made go through a strict
inspection before it is released or sent to the consumer."). Examined patents should
likewise go through such a process before patent issuance, as this would significantly
reduce the number of weak or invalid patents issued, see infra note 276.
273 See supra note 8 (overview of reexamination and IPR proceedings).
274 See supra note 243 (explaining that Congress' first attempt at post grant review was
unsuccessful and left the public uncertain and wary of the scope of protection of patent
rights. Doulin states
The first non-judicial opportunity for post-issuance review of U.S. patents came in 1981
when Congress created the process of ex parte reexamination. (See Act of December 12,
1980 (Bayh-Dole Act), Pub. L. No. 96-517, ch. 30, § 302,94 Stat. 3015,3015 (codified at 35
U.S.C. § 302 (2012)).) That procedure allowed any member of the public, at any time
during the life of the patent, to request that the Patent Office take a "second look" at an
issued patent. A "second look" involved reconsidering whether the patent does in fact
satisfy the conditions of novelty and non-obviousness. (35 U.S.C. § 301). The result of this
experiment was that the procedure was often employed multiple times against the same
patent, leaving the patentees (and the public) perpetually uncertain of the scope and even
the very existence of the patent rights. (See generally Raymond A. Mercado, The Use and
Abuse of Patent Reexamination: Sham Petitioning Before the USPTO, 12 COLUM. SCI.
TECH. L. Rev. 93 (2011) (discussing abuses in the patent reexamination process). ) Nor did
the ex parte reexamination succeed in "weeding out" many patents. In fact, the vast
majority of patents emerged from the process with their claims either fully confirmed or
just moderately amended. (See Robert Harkins, How the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act
(AlA) Is Changing Patent Protection and Litigation, ASPATORE (Jan. 2013), 2013 WL
571334, at *5.). Id. at 893-94.)
275 See Brief for US Inventor, Inc. and 31 other Grass Roots Inventor Organizations in
Support of Petitioner at p. 5, Oil States Energy Serv., LLC v. Greene's Energy Group, LLC,
No. 16-712 ("With patents less attractive, inventors increasingly favor trade secrecy as their
mode of protection (if it is even available)").
276

See supra note 40.

Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Imp. Co., 59 U.S. 272, 285 (1856) (stating
"[t]o avoid misconstruction upon so grave a subject," Congress cannot "withdraw from
judicial cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common
law, or in equity, or admiralty") (emphasis added).
277
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However, to address patent quality concerns, I propose opening the patent
examination phase to public participation in an opposition proceeding, as
discussed below. If the PTO addresses patent validity during the examination
phase, the question is one of patentability, not validity, and the question of
patentability fits squarely within the purview of the PTO. As a result, any
quality control measure instituted by the PTO should occur before rights vest,
not after. Any attempt by the PTO to revoke, cancel or annul patent rights
after those rights vest raises a constitutional issue. 278
B. Proposed PTO Quality Review Process
I propose a quality review process that allows the PTO to improve the
quality of the patents issued by inviting the public to participate in the patent
issuance process. My proposal provides two important benefits: (1) examiners
would have an opportunity to consider prior art unavailable at or unknown to
the PTO during examination and (2) a more thorough assessment of
patentability would occur before an actual patent grant. In accordance with
W. Edward Deming's 14 Point quality management practices, the proposed
process would allow the PTO to design quality into its patent examination
system rather than inspecting for quality after patent issuance, which is the
current situation and is out of step with the purpose and goal of a sound quality
control program. 279 The PTO through its PTAB proceedings invalidates many
patents annually because petitioners submit prior art that the patent examiner
did not consider, or for various reasons was unknown to the examiner, during
the original examination. 28 0 The proposed quality review process significantly
impacts the scope of prior art available to the PTO for assessing patentability
prior to patent issuance.
A proposal of the type suggested here is not a new concept in the United
States, as similar proposals that included a six month period opposition period
following patent issuance were made in 1943 and 1966.281 Even Judge Giles
See supra note 40.
W. Edward Deming and Richard Saunders, Quality Analysis, and Total Behavior
Management, 17 The Behavior Analyst 115, 117 (1994).
280 See supra notes 8, 15 and accompanying
text.
281 REP. OF THE NAT'L PAT. PLAN. COMMISSION, 78th Congo (1943), reprinted
in 25 J. PAT.
278

279

OFF. SoCY 455, 460-61 (1943); see also REP. OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON PAT.

Sys., S. Rep. No. 90-5, at 28-29 (1st Sess. 1967) (for a discussion of the 1966 President's
Committee on patent reform); see also John C. Stedman, Invention and Public Policy, 12
Duke L. & Contemp. Probs. 649, 658 (Fall 1947) (suggesting Opposition proceedings as
one means for reducing the number of invalid patents, but at the same time criticizing
Opposition proceedings because of a violation of secrecy. However, under the American
Inventors Protection Act of 1999, the PTO began publishing patent applications that had an
effective filing date of November 29, 2000, eighteen months after the effective filing date.
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Rich, the preeminent authority on patent law of his time, respected appeals
court judge and author of the 1952 Patent Act, favored such pre-grant
oppositions.282 Judge Rich once wrote, "Oppositions shortly after patent
rights come into being (between five months and one year in the British
'belated opposition') are favored." 28 3 Although Congress never adopted either
of these positions, most likely due to the potential for extending the PTO
examination period, the benefits of a quality examination before rights vest is
more beneficial that stripping away vested private rights in an administrative
adjudication.
The proposed procedure is similar to the patent opposition process used
by the European Patent Office. 28 4 Once the examination process has
concluded, but before patent rights attach, the PTO would publish the
approved claims for public consideration. The public would have three
monthS 28 5 to file an opposition challenging the validity of the patent claims.
Or if the PTO has instituted other post-grant reviews, the public would have
three months after termination of that post-grant review to file an opposition.
The process would be similar to existing IPR proceedings in that an
interested party could file a petition for review with the PTO. Petition
challenges would be limited to questions of novelty or obviousness in view
of prior art patents and printed publications not already part of the
examination record. The patentee would have an opportunity to file a
preliminary response to the Petition. The PTO would then have the final
decision as to whether it should or should not institute the opposition. Again,
the PTO would make its determination based on a reasonable likelihood that
a petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one claim challenged. The
PTO would have one year (extendable for good cause by six months) to
decide an opposition instituted for a particular case. This procedure would
allow the PTO to exercise a quality review over its work, but not violate a

So preserving applications in secret is no longer a valid concern against publishing allowed
patent applications for opposition for all applications that are published).
282 See supra note 243 at 894 (citing Giles S. Rich, Forward and Comments on Post
Issuance Reexamination, 4 APLA QJ. 86, 88 (1976) (stating a patent "opposition
[procedure] enables one to take advantage of the principle that almost anything done over
again a second time can be done better than it was the first time.")).
283 See supra note 243 at 894 (citing Rich, supra note 191, at 87-88 (emphasis added)).
284 See Eu. PAT. OFF.,
Oppositions,
https://www.epo.org/applying/european/oppositions.html (outlining the opposition process).
285 Three months provide ample to time to file an Opposition, particularly because patent
applications are published within 18 months of their filing date, and in the U.S. it may be
another 24 to 36 months before the PTO issues a Notice of Allowance. Therefore,
interested parties are put on notice of the pendency of a potential patent grant, and have
ample time to prepare for to file an Opposition request.
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patentee's vested patent rights, because any rights at the time of review would
be merely nascent rights.
In its amicus brief, the PTAB Bar Association argued that patent
reexamination and other post-grant review processes have existed for
decades. 28 6 However, longevity alone does not equate to success. In fact, the
recurring attempts to find a post-grant procedure that addresses the "weak 287
patent" issue while at the same time not unduly undermining the intent of the
Patent System, is proof that current and past systems have failed or are failing.
Prior to the implementation of AIA IPR proceedings, there were few
options for the public to challenge the validity of a patent, so there were many
potentially weak patents in public use. As Justice Douglass stated in his
concurrence in GreatAtlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment
Corp.,288 "weak" patents "illustrate how far our patent system frequently
departs from the constitutional standards which are supposed to govern" the
granting of patent rights.2 89
The proposed opposition proceeding comes at a time before rights
attached, and, thus, provides a remedy for addressing the "weak" patent issue
which does not violate a patentee's rights in having validity tried before the
PTO. Under the new procedure, the public would be given a limited time to
contest patent validity (i.e., patentability) before the PTO. Once the time
period for opposition expires and no opposition has been filed, any party
seeking to challenge patent validity would have to file a federal court action
(which would require Congress to amend the Patent Act to authorize this type
of challenge). The time limitations for filing an opposition, encourage the
timely filing of an opposition during the examination phase. After the
examination phase has ended and the patent issues, patent owners should be
able to rely on and trust the PTO determination of patentability. Preputial
exposure of patent owners to the possibility of administrative revocation of
patent rights creates an untrustworthy system. As professor Doulin states:
It is one thing to allow a limited post issuance time period where members
of the public are allowed to attempt to convince the Patent Office that the
patent was issued in error. It is quite another to have the Damocles sword of
post-issuance review perpetually hang over the patentee's head.29 0

See generally supra note 243 (discussing patent reform, including post-grant review
procedures enacted or proposed in the United States since enactment of the U.S. patent
laws).
287 Patents that should have never issued because the claims do not satisfy the requirements
for patentability.
288 340 U.S. 147, 158 (1950) (Douglas, J., concurring).
289 Id.
290 See supra note 243 at 883.
286
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The latter system that Doulin addresses undermines the faith and
confidence in the U.S. patent system. The proposed system comports with the

PTO's objective of issuing strong patents. While Congress intended AIA IPR
proceedings to help end patent trolls' and non-practicing entities' ravaging of
legitimate businesses; we cannot defeat these enemies at the expense of the
integrity of the IP Clause. If we want to keep America great, we need to
maintain a strong, vibrant patent system that promotes disclosure, rather than
encouraging secrecy, 291 as some inventors are now deciding to withhold their
inventions in secret rather than disclose in a patent application and risk an
invalidity ruling at the PTO. The Honorable Randall Rader, former Chief
Judge of the CAFC, describes current PTAB IPR proceedings as "death
squads killing property rights." 292 That cannot be allowed to continue!

CONCLUSION
When the Framers drafted the United States Constitution, particularly,

Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 (the "IP Clause"), they empowered Congress to
create a Patent System "securing for limited Times to ... Inventors the
exclusive Right to their ... Discoveries." Two key components of this
constitutional directive are "securing" and "exclusive right." To help promote
the economic stability and growth of their fledgling nation, the Framers,
through the Constitution, gave Congress the ability to create a contractual
relationship between the government and the most creative members of
society - artists and inventors. 293 In exchange for disclosing their creative
endeavors, artists and inventors would be granted exclusive right to their
creations for a limited time. The grant of rights in exchange for disclosing
their inventions was the quid pro quo the Patent Act promises inventors-

disclose and get. 2 9 4 The Framers intended this contract to "secure" these rights
291

See supra note 293 (patent publications promote shared knowledge that aids innovation).

292

Tony Dutra, Rader Regrets CLS Bank Impasse, Comments on Latest PatentReform Bill

(Oct. 29, 2013), https://www.bna.com/rader-regrets-cls-nl7179879684/ (Chief Judge
Randall R. Rader provided this quote in a speech given at the AIPLA Annual Meeting in
October 2013. Judge Rader reasserted his assessment of the PTAB at a March 21, 2014,
conference hosted by the George Mason University School of Law).
293 Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. 218 (1832) (Justice John Marshall articulating the contract
nature of patent grants in his opinion. It is the reward stipulated for the advantages derived
by the public for the exertions of the individual and is intended as a stimulus to those
exertions. The laws which are passed to give effect to this purpose ought, we think, to be
construed in the spirit in which they have been made; and to execute the contract fairly on
the part of the United States, where the full benefit has been received).
294 See Stedman, infra note 180 at 656 (stating "the deal between the Government and the
patentee is simply this: The Government agrees to give a seventeen-year right to exclude
others in exchange for the inventor's public disclosure of his invention") (reminding the
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privately in inventors in the way one holds rights in other property in which
it has perfected rights. 295 The rights secured include both enforcement and
validity, as 19th-century courts did not distinguish between rights in validity
and enforcement, as both issues were considered matters tried at common law.
Per today's debate, it should not matter whether the validity question arises
before the PTO or in a court proceeding. Validity issues arise only after patent
rights attach, and a court or the PTO must then review the patent claims to
determine if they meet the statutory requirements for patentability. If the
either the PTO or a court determines patentability to be lacking, the
inventor/patent owner loses rights - rights that stem from the Constitution,
promulgated by statute and endorsed by the courts as private property rights.
Current IPR proceedings are in direct contrast to the Founding Fathers'
intent that inventors receive vested private property rights in exchange for
disclosing their inventions. Allowing an administrative agency to adjudicate
private constitutional rights undermines the intent and purpose of the IP
Clause. For more than 150 years, the Supreme Court has held patent rights to
be private property rights. The Supreme Court must not and should not ignore
its own precedent.

reader that the new patent term is 20 years from the date of filing rather than 17 years from
the date of issuance).
295 See Seth L. Cooper and Randolph J. May, The Public ContractBasis of Intellectual
PropertyRights, THE FREE ST. FOUNDATION (April 19, 2016),
http://www.freestatefoundation.org/images/ThePublicContractBasis-of IntellectualPr
opertyRights_041816.pdf, at 3 (addressing the issue of whether the public contract theory
for awarding and protecting patent rights negates an argument for patent rights as private
property rights based on the natural rights. Cooper and May argue that the "principles of
[the] contract [theory], reflected in both the social compact theory and in public contracts,
form a continuous link between natural rights and intellectual property protections. The
contract basis for IP rights, as an embodiment of natural rights principles, reinforces the just
claims of inventors and creative artists to protections for their vested property interests in
the fruits of their labors")

